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Military deception (MILDEC) operations have a long and illustrious place in 
America’s battlefield history. To great effect, MILDEC has enabled countless victories in 
every U.S. conflict since the Revolutionary War. However, the United States has allowed 
its deception capability to atrophy. Possible explanations for our MILDEC divestiture 
range from structural insufficiencies to an ethical framework that emphasizes truth and 
transparency. Simultaneously, the onset of the Information Age has leveled the playing 
field between state and non-state actors (NSA) and proved that lasting victory cannot be 
achieved by force alone. Yet, due in part to the difficulty involved in quantifiably 
measuring information strategy, the contemporary military’s acceptance and 
understanding of information warfare has been limited. This necessitates the re-
examination of U.S. information strategy formulation to address more effectively the 
challenges and complexities encountered in the human domain. To overcome this 
impediment, this thesis examines the intangible aspects of information warfare and 
proposes a structured decision-making tool capable of generating precise computations of 
optimal information strategies. “By Force or by Fraud” is a quantitative assessment of 
MILDEC’s utility on the modern battlefield that is qualitatively tested against historic 
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I. EXAMINATION OF THE U.S. DIVESTITURE FROM 
DECEPTION OPERATIONS  
Every kind of service necessary to the public good becomes 
honorable by being necessary. 
—Nathan Hale 
Military Deception (MILDEC) operations are tightly woven into the fabric of 
America’s battlefield history. Examples of U.S. deception operations first appear in the 
Revolutionary War, championed by a man famed for his inability to tell a lie, George 
Washington. These shadowy and sometimes controversial operations played a critical 
role in securing countless victories in such conflicts as World War II and Desert Storm. 
Despite a 250-year track record of demonstrated utility, however, today’s U.S. military 
has allowed this critical capability to atrophy. 
A. THE PROBLEM 
The complexities of the Information Age have altered the nature of conflict. 
Large-scale, state-on-state battles have transitioned to smaller, localized conflicts against 
irregular ideologically aligned groups. These changes, combined with an increasingly 
restrictive international system, have severely limited the manner in which U.S. combat 
power is now employed. Compounding the difficulty, force reductions threaten to expose 
a dangerous capability gap in the United States’ effectiveness and ability to respond, 
which inevitably emboldens adversaries.1 
Conflict in the Information Age transcends traditional notions of the “battlefield,” 
occurring largely among civilian populations and is conducted almost exclusively in the 
human domain, necessitating innovative, low-cost, small-footprint approaches to 
                                                 
1 Jennifer Griffin and Lucas Tomlinson, “Army Chief Odierno, in Exit Interview, Says U.S. could 




national-security objectives.2 Despite a need for the agile and savvy employment of 
limited resources, the modern U.S. military machine favors a strict ideal of truthful-
information campaigns. While current social-science research attempts to explain why 
deception has fallen into disuse, very little recent research examines the utility of 
deception operations against the threats encountered on today’s battlefield.  
B. PURPOSE 
This thesis assesses the efficacy of deception as a tactic against the asymmetrical 
threats characteristic of the Information Age. The goal is to provide commanders and 
practitioners with qualitative examples and quantifiable metrics on deception operations, 
for use in optimizing military effectiveness. Proposed is a model by which all the 
capabilities of the U.S. information arsenal may be leveraged—including deception as 
appropriate. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This research asks the following:  
1. In the context of contemporary warfare, what is the optimal combination 
of truthful and deceptive information to employ in achieving military 
objectives?  
2. What conditions are necessary to maximize Military Deception 
effectiveness?  
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
In examining the causes of U.S. divestiture from deception operations, two 
polarized viewpoints have emerged. One group attributes the deterioration of MILDEC 
capability to structural problems—poorly funded or undermanned institutions, burdened 
by bureaucracy, are no longer able to provide adequate support to MILDEC. Others point 
to the rise of a modern ethical framework that stresses American moral integrity as 
paramount and rejects short-term gains at the expense of long-term credibility. 
                                                 
2 Leon Panetta, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense (Washington, 
DC: Department of Defense, 2012), http://archive.defense.gov/news/Defense_Strategic_Guidance.pdf. 
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1. Institutional Frameworks 
Before World War II, the United States lacked an institutional framework for the 
systematic undertaking of deception operations. Deception was planned and executed by 
geographic combatant commanders who had no mechanism for tracking the 
development, deconfliction, or resourcing of the “black arts.” As fighting intensified in 
the early years of World War II and more theater commands found themselves in the 
deception business, a series of operational missteps revealed the need for an organization 
dedicated to planning, executing and synchronizing MILDEC operations.3 
In November 1942, the Joint Security Control (JSC) was established by the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff; one of its first missions was to coordinate strategic deception operations 
for pending Allied operations in North Africa.4 Throughout the remainder of World War 
II, the JSC directed the planning, execution, and implementation of highly effective 
deception operations that contributed significantly to the victory over Germany and 
Japan. Despite its many achievements, however, the organization did not survive the war, 
and many highly valuable tactics, techniques, and procedures, defined and refined in 
battle, were lost.  
In 1953, the U.S. acknowledged the need for an organization that could 
effectively employ information operations. Spurred largely by a need to counter Russian 
propaganda, president Dwight D. Eisenhower created the U.S. Information Agency 
(USIA). While not dedicated to MILDEC, the USIA effectively resynchronized U.S. 
information strategy.5 The organization enjoyed a successful 44-year run before its 
dissolution in 1999 by President Bill Clinton. The agency had become closely identified 
with the Cold War, and few saw a need to maintain an institutional framework for 
information strategy and deception against an enemy that no longer existed.6 
                                                 
3 Katherine L. Herbig, “American Strategic Deception in the Pacific: 1942–44.” Intelligence and 
National Security 2, no. 3 (July 1987): 261. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Shawn J. Parry-Giles, “The Eisenhower Administration’s Conceptualization of USIA: The 




USIA departments and capabilities were absorbed by a number of agencies within 
the departments of defense and state, among them the Undersecretary of State for Public 
Affairs and Public Diplomacy and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. 
Unfortunately, the resulting compartmentalization and communication challenges among 
departments reduced formerly coordinated programs to independent operational efforts 
which were severely limited in collaboration and synchronization.  
In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, former secretary of defense Donald Rumsfeld 
championed the creation of the Office of Strategic Influence (OSI). Charged primarily 
with supporting the war on terrorism through the targeted employment of psychological 
operations against U.S. adversaries, the OSI was America’s first dedicated attempt at 
institutionalizing information warfare since World War II. However, the OSI was 
immediately besieged by negative publicity and accused of deceiving the public by 
presenting false information, images, and statements in the media.7  
Despite Pentagon assurances that OSI would not use news media outlets to 
conduct deception operations, criticism mounted.8 Ultimately, less than five months after 
its establishment, the OSI was deactivated by the Department of Defense over concerns 
that it undermined U.S. credibility because it was perceived as lying to the public.9  
In Deception: Appeal for Acceptance; Discourse on Doctrine; Preface to 
Planning, retired Air Force general officer Walter Jajko makes a pointed prediction about 
the future of deception operations in an environment without an institutionalized 
structure:  
Without a permanent apparatus to create, conduct, control and 
contemplate deception operations, resources will be wasted, security will 
be jeopardized, operations will be amateurish, and the probability of 
failure will be increased. A permanent organization can ensure that 
                                                 
7 Jon Krakauer, Where Men Win Glory (New York: Doubleday, 2009), 206. 
8 CNN, “New Pentagon Office to Spearhead Information War,” February 20, 2002 
http://www.cnn.com/2002/U.S./02/19/gen.strategic.influence/index.html?_s=PM:U.S. 
9 Susan L. Gough, “The Evolution of Strategic Influence,” Strategy Research Project, U.S. Army War 
College, 2003. 
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operations can conform to policy and are mutually supporting with other 
activities, or at least not conflicting, and may even be made synergistic.10  
2. Philosophical Constraints 
As a nation, the United States has long prided itself on principles of honesty, 
integrity and transparency; yet the employment of deception operations is seen as 
standing in overt contradiction to the country’s ethical foundations. Many American 
philosophical ideals are grounded in the works of Immanuel Kant, the architect of 
“principled ethics,” also known as deontology. In his 1785 work, Grounding for the 
Metaphysics of Morals, Kant identifies the social categorical imperative, which is, in 
essence, the duty not to lie,11 and posits that this imperative is a morally binding contract 
grounded in shared reasoning that applies to all persons at all times.12  
Michael I. Handel builds upon Kantian ethics in his work, Intelligence and 
Deception, noting that “those who frequently deceive lose credibility.”13 While short-
term gains can be achieved through deception, there are long-term credibility issues that 
must be weighted. Although the U.S. military retains an appreciation for MILDEC and an 
ability to conduct tactical level deception operations, it recognizes that sustained use has 
the potential to erode U.S. credibility on the international stage and undermine our ability 
to enter, forge, and maintain key alliances.14 
Perhaps the most compelling argument supporting divestiture is that expressed by 
the American philosopher Sissela Bok. In Lying: Moral Choice in Public and Private 
Life, Bok examines the pitfalls of deception and the moral dilemmas associated with 
deliberately misleading others. Deceit inevitably erodes credibility; and as mistrust, 
anxiety, and other dysfunctions follow, social functioning, which requires some degree of 
                                                 
10 Walter Jajko, “Deception: Appeal for Acceptance; Discourse on Doctrine; Preface to Planning,” 
Comparative Strategy 21, no. 5 (December 2002): 355. 
11 “Duty and Reason as the Ultimate Principle: Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysic of 
Morals,” In G. Lober DA 471 Critical Thinking and Ethical Decision Making course handout Monterey, 
CA: Naval Postgraduate School. 
12 Ibid. 




truth in words and actions, is impaired.15  “Some level of truthfulness has always been 
essential to human society, no matter how deficient the observance of other moral 
principles. Even the devils themselves, as Samuel Johnson said, do not lie to one another, 
since society of Hell could not subsist without truth any more than others.”16 
Similarly, in Winning Hearts and Minds: A Social Influence Analysis, social 
psychologist Anthony Pratkanis observes, “Americans have a strong dislike of and 
aversion to the use of influence tactics to promote national goals,”17 asserting that the 
deeds and words of democracies must be synchronized. It follows that the long-term 
effect of propagating a truthful narrative compliant with democratic values greatly 
outweighs the short-term value achieved through deception operations. The discipline on 
the leading edge of influence operations, Psychological Operations (PSYOP), approaches 
deceptive manipulation with a great amount of trepidation. “Credibility is key to 
successful products because the use and discovery of untruthful information irrevocably 
damages or destroys their and their originator’s credibility.”18 
E. HYPOTHESES 
The hypotheses of this research are as follows: 
1. Deception is a viable tool of warfare, and this can be quantitatively 
demonstrated. 
2. Optimal truthful–deceptive informational ratios can be identified and 
modified when the critical conditions of narrative, unity of effort, target 
audiences, commitment, information dominance, and timing are met.  
F. METHODOLOGY 
This study examines the efficacy of deception operations against the irregular 
threats of the Information Age. Using the Analytic-Hierarchy Process (AHP), game-
theoretical modeling, and case studies, the optimal combination of truthful and deceptive 
                                                 
15 Sissela Bok, Lying: Moral Choice in Public and Private Life (New York: Vintage, 2011), 18. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Anthony R. Pratkanis, “Winning Hearts and Minds: A Social Influence Analysis,” in Information 
Strategy and Warfare, ed. John Arquilla and Douglas A. Borer (New York: Routledge, 2007), 78. 
18 Department of the Army, Psychological Operations (FM 3–05.30) (Washington, DC, 2005), A-1. 
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information is assessed in the context of modern non-standard threats and conditions 
necessary to maximize MILDEC effectiveness. 
Starting with the understanding of MILDEC as a historical component of 
American warfare and a categorical information task defined by current doctrine, its role 
in contemporary conflicts is examined. The Information Age, with its new technologies, 
has altered the traditional role of deception operations. This study investigates the 
conditions, factors, and circumstances that tend to optimize the use of MILDEC in 
military operations. 
Game theory is used to model an interactive competition between the U.S. and a 
hypothetical non-state threat, where both sides employ information capabilities and 
kinetics. These capabilities are defined and isolated as potential courses of action to 
determine the likely outcome of a synthesized conflict.  
Next, the AHP, a comprehensive, quantitative framework for structuring decision 
problems and evaluating alternative solutions, will be used to prioritize those army 
information tasks (i.e., information engagement, command and control warfare, 
information protection, operations security and military deception) best suited for the 
hypothetical battle.19 These tools will be analyzed in relationship to the specifically 
determined operational factors (narrative, unity of effort, target audiences, commitment, 
information dominance, and timing) and prioritized in a rational and consistent manner. 
The numerical values that result from this process determine which alternatives are best 
able to meet the decision goal. This procedure provides a mathematical framework for the 
creation of a follow-up game model in which the adversaries compete exclusively in the 
realm of information. 
This research presents a second game, in which the categories of information are 
reduced to truth or lies to yield an idealized ratio of truthful to deceptive informational 
strategies. The outcome of the game is employed as a tentative theory to be tested against 
historical case studies. 
                                                 
19 Department of the Army, Operations (FM 3–0) (Washington, DC, 2008), 7–2. 
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The case-study analysis in this research offers qualitative scenarios in which to 
validate the quantitative findings. The studies address the effectiveness of deception and 
the operational factors that may make it the desirable course of action. The cases are 
chosen to illustrate the variations on truth and deception contained in the information 
campaigns of both state and non-states. Each case is analyzed using a combination of 
AHP and game theory to identify the truth–deception ratio on both sides.  
Whether there is empirical evidence, through mathematical modeling and 
historical case studies, that MILDEC may in certain circumstances be the optimal tool 
against modern threats is the central investigation of this research. Given the nature of 
modern conflict, it is imperative that Special Operations Forces (SOF) seek low-cost, 
small-footprint solutions to lethal problems. The optimization tool offered by this 
research addresses this requirement and may be manipulated and refined for other aspects 




II. REDEFINING INFORMATION STRATEGY ANALYSIS 
The most dangerous asymmetry is the inadequacy of conception in 
policy and strategy. 
—Brigadier General Walter Jajko 
Impervious to the ravages of time and technological advancement, MILDEC 
transcends the technological evolution of weaponry and equipment. Yet deception 
operations, once an indispensable tool in the U.S. arsenal, have been underused in 
modern conflicts, despite the reality that under constrained resources and military options 
and a casualty-adverse polity, the military may gain considerable advantage from a 
revival of military deception.  
Today’s asymmetrical threats have demonstrated that victory is not assured 
through the unilateral application of traditional forms of combat power. This new reality 
obviates “the perceived need to approach every crisis by invoking the Powell doctrine’s 
mantra of “overwhelming force.”20 The onset of rapidly advancing multimedia 
technologies has leveled the playing field within the international system, challenging 
many long-held military paradigms. This revolution in warfighting has significant 
implications for mission planning and analysis tools, which, when executed according to 
Clausewitizian-based theories of warfare, have failed to decisively defeat weaker 
adversaries. 
“It is already readily apparent that the importance of information strategy is 
growing relative to that of military strategy. In such a world, skillful information strategy 
is likely to prove the difference between victory and defeat.”21 This shift has exposed 
critical insufficiencies in the current military-information strategy and associated doctrine 
regarding combating threats that possess an asymmetrical informational advantage. To 
optimize information warfare, an analysis tool for information strategy that integrates the 
                                                 
20 John Arquilla, “Introduction,” in Information Strategy and Warfare, ed. John Arquilla and Douglas 
A. Borer (New York: Routledge, 2007), 12. 
21 Ibid., 9. 
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fundamentals of operational art, information operations, psychological operations, and 
counterinsurgency (COIN) principles is required. Using this model to analyze historical 
cases may yield quantifiable metrics for use in decision-making tools, as well as support 
decision makers seeking informational solutions today and in the future.  
A. DOCTRINAL INSUFFICIENCIES 
The use of operational art during the intelligence preparation of the battlefield 
(IPB) or joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment (JIPOE) processes 
are at best a collaborative, creative process that provides a realistic assessment as to how 
a force will “employ its capabilities to achieve the military end state.”22 At worst, this 
process can become an oversimplified staff exercise that lacks the depth of systematic 
assessment needed in combating Information-Age threats. The tenets of operational art 
(time, space, and force) and of the political, military, economic, social, information, 
infrastructure-physical environment, and time (PMESSII-PT) are too broad to use in 
engaging abstract concepts such as the ideologies and behaviors fueling modern 
conflict.23 Having been developed and refined in conventional warfare, these legacy 
tenets fail to address the complexities of the human domain, which limit their 
effectiveness of information-strategy formulation.  
American military doctrine, over-reliant on the tenets of Clausewitizian combat 
power, has not sufficiently adapted to confront the ideologically aligned threats that 
operate in the human domain. For example, FM 3–24, Counterinsurgency, and FM 3–0, 
Chapter 7, Information Superiority, superficially addresses the concept of information 
asymmetry but provides insufficient guidance on attacking this imbalance. FM 3–24 
states:  
Insurgents have an additional advantage in shaping the information 
environment. Counterinsurgents seeking to preserve legitimacy must stick 
to the truth and make sure that words are backed up by deeds; insurgents, 
                                                 
22 Joint Publication 5–0, Joint Operation Planning (JP 5–0) (2011), III-1. 
23 Brian M. Ducote, “Challenging the Application of PMESII-PT in a Complex Environment” 
(master’s thesis, Kansas University, 2010), 5. 
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on the other hand, can make exorbitant promises and point out government 
shortcomings, many caused or aggravated by the insurgency.24  
In most cases, the insurgent begins with the advantage of initiative. However, as 
FM 3–24 states, “Ironically, as insurgents achieve more success and begin to control 
larger portions of the populace, many of these asymmetries diminish. That may produce 
new vulnerabilities that adaptive counterinsurgents can exploit.”25 In other words, the 
more state-like an insurgent becomes, the more accountable it becomes and the more 
susceptible it is to public opinion. Therefore, the ability to “conquer” the information 
environment is nested in the exploitation of environmental conditions that change 
constantly, thus requiring more accurate assessment principles. Needed is a flexible 
system of assessment and fluid improvisation, a concept that David Kilcullen describes as 
“adaptation battle.”26 Adaptation, by its very nature, is a bottom-up process that takes its 
cues from reality rather than doctrine. Adaptation is a necessity in COIN and IO due to 
their roots in the human domain. 
Contemporary examples of information warfare, as found in the Global War On 
Terrorism (GWOT), reflect over-reliance on truthful, population-centered messaging.27 
Very little attention is given to MILDEC, owing to its negative connotations and the fear 
that it may produce accidental civilian casualties.28 Yet ignoring MILDEC over 
perceived ethical constraints severely limits the tools in the informational arsenal. Rather, 
MILDEC, which has traditionally focused on targeting enemy decision-makers, may be 
exactly what is needed to mitigate enemy information asymmetries. 
B. INFORMATION STRATEGY ANALYSIS 
Effective information strategy requires the identification and analysis of those 
factors necessary for achieving a decisive advantage, which are categorized as narrative, 
                                                 
24 Department of the Army, Counterinsurgency (FM 3–24) (Washington, DC, 2006), 1–3. 
25 Ibid. 
26 David Kilcullen, Counterinsurgency (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 2. 
27 Department of the Army, Counterinsurgency, 1–3. 
28 Ibid. 
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unity of effort, target audiences, commitment, information dominance, and timing.29 
These factors provide a basis for advocacy, prioritization, and resourcing of information 
solutions and must be assessed internally and externally for a clear picture of how 
psychological factors affect the achievement of objectives, for both sides.  
In this thesis, the concepts of narrative, unity of effort, target audiences, 
commitment, information dominance, and timing have been refined and repurposed from 
FM 3–24, Counterinsurgency; FM 3–05.301, Psychological Operations; FM 3–10, 
Information Operations; and other scholarly works on counterinsurgency. This research 
examines these factors to formulate the hypotheses tested in the case-study analysis and 
the evaluation of multiple-criteria decision-making tools. 
1. Narrative 
Defined in FM 3–24 as, “the central mechanism, expressed in story form, through 
which ideologies are expressed and absorbed,”30 narrative is the inspiration of popular 
support through the application of words and deeds. Essential to the successful 
exploitation of narrative is a bottom-up intelligence process, coupled with an accurate 
assessment of how the counterinsurgency’s methods are perceived in relation to their 
message: 
Higher headquarters usually establishes the COIN narrative. However, 
only leaders, Soldiers, and Marines at the lowest levels know the details 
needed to tailor it to local conditions and generate leverage from it. 
Company-level leaders apply the narrative gradually. They get to know 
local opinion makers, win their trust, and learn what motivates them. Then 
they build on this knowledge to find a single narrative that emphasizes the 
inevitability and rightness of the COIN operation’s success. This is art, not 
science.31 
                                                 
29 Barton Whaley, Stratagem: Deception and Surprise in War (Cambridge: Center for International 
Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1969), 87. 
30Department of the Army, Counterinsurgency, glossary. 
31 Ibid., A-7. 
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a. Measuring Narrative 
Drawing from Robert Thompson’s “five principles of counterinsurgency,” based 
on the experience of the British army in the Malayan insurgency, John A. Nagl 
emphasizes that “the government must have a clear political aim” and a unified message, 
supported by a plan of action that must “function in accordance with law,” that is 
accepted by the populace.32 Narrative is measured according to the presence or absence 
of three sub-factors: a unified message, aligned actions, and the perception of justice.33 A 
unified message is a single narrative that is nested throughout the counterinsurgent 
organization; aligned actions are the physical manifestations of the narrative; and the 
perception of justice is the perceived agreement of words and deeds as seen through the 
eyes of the people. The various combinations of these sub-factors create strengths and 
weakness for both friendly and enemy forces, and understanding this dynamic aids in 
course-of-action development.34  
b. Narrative: Hypotheses  
This topic features two hypotheses: 
1. States: For counterinsurgents to achieve legitimacy for their cause, their 
stated narrative and actions must be aligned, unified, and in support of a 
state that is perceived as just in the eyes of the populace. 
2. Non-State Actors: The further the distance between the state’s narrative 
and perceived actions, the more legitimate the insurgent’s narrative and 
the righteousness of their actions in the eyes of the population.   
2. Unity of Effort 
FM 3–24, Counterinsurgency, states “all organizations contributing to a COIN 
operation should strive, or be persuaded to strive” toward a singular goal through “unity 
of effort.”35 In achieving a unified effort, it is critical to identify which entity is taking the 
lead, whether the host nation, the Department of State (DOS), Special Forces, or 
                                                 
32 John A. Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup With a Knife (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), 29. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Department of the Army, Counterinsurgency, 2–3. 
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conventional forces, as this entity will ultimately guide the information strategy and 
shape its purposes. Each participant has its own perspectives and organic capabilities, but 
united efforts are necessary to avoid conflicting messages, also known as information 
fratricide. As stated in Principles, Imperatives, and Paradoxes of Counterinsurgency, “all 
actions, kinetic or non-kinetic, must be planned and executed with consideration of their 
contribution toward strengthening the host government’s legitimacy and achieving the 
U.S. Government’s political goals.”36 In information operations, it is important for 
messaging to originate with the host nation. Until this can been done effectively in any 
instance, other entities (e.g., DoS, SOF) must coordinate with the host nation to arrange a 
desirable attribution. Likewise, an insurgent’s ability to conduct information warfare 
must be assessed to determine the breadth of its capabilities and closeness to the 
population.  
a. Measuring Unity of Effort 
To achieve unity of effort, Cohen et al. advise the following: “Manage 
information and expectations” (the government’s ability to fulfill promises to the people), 
“use measured force” (avoid civilian casualties, collateral damage, and the associated 
informational consequences they lead to), and “learn and adapt” (quickly assess and 
target insurgent vulnerabilities).37  
Unity of effort is measured according to the degree of political attunement, 
military competency, and asymmetric capabilities exhibited.38 Political attunement refers 
to the actor’s ability to connect with the populace and provide needed public services. 
Military competency is determined by assessing the demonstrated ability of both sides to 
conduct population-centric warfare. Asymmetric capabilities are those elements within 
each force structure devoted to rapidly learning and targeting enemy weaknesses.39 
                                                 
36 Eliot Cohen, Conrad Crane, Jan Horvath, and John Nagl, “Principles, Imperatives, and Paradoxes of 
Counterinsurgency,” Military Review (March-April 2006): 49–53. 




b. Unity of Effort: Hypotheses 
This topic has two hypotheses: 
1. States: The closer the counterinsurgent forces are to the indigenous 
population, in terms of cultural composition and understanding, the more 
effective their messaging will be. 
2. Non-State Actors: The further counterinsurgent forces are from a 
population’s cultural composition and understanding, the easier for 
insurgent forces to exploit their messaging. 
3. Target Audiences 
A target audience is defined in FM 3–05.301 as “an individual or group selected 
for influence or attack.”40 While counterinsurgents may use the full informational 
spectrum, from truth to lies, they must avoid blowback, or the unintentional casualties of 
deceptive information. It is never advisable for a state or host nation seeking legitimacy 
to deceive the population. However, this maxim has been misinterpreted as meaning 
“thou shalt not lie.” It must be understood that the enemy is always a prime target for any 
lies or deceptions that create initiative and the space needed to positively engage the 
population.  
Insurgents are not bound by the same truth constraints as counterinsurgents. As 
the field manual notes, “Insurgents, on the other hand, can make exorbitant promises and 
point out government shortcomings, many caused or aggravated by the insurgency.”41 
Such a strategy focuses on short-term benefits. As the insurgency seeks greater 
legitimacy, its words and deeds must begin to align, lest popular support deteriorate. 
a. Measuring Target Audiences 
In “Psychological Operations: A New Variation on an Age Old Art: Hezbollah 
versus Israel,” Ron Schleifer states that target audiences, which are the primary focus of 
psychological warfare, “can be divided into three groups: the home audience, enemy 
                                                 
40 Department of the Army, Psychological Operations Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (FM 3–
05.301) (Washington, DC: Department of the Army 2003), 8–18. 
41 Department of the Army, Counterinsurgency, 1–3. 
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audience, and neutrals.”42 Each audience must be approached differently: the home 
audience must be convinced of the justness of the cause, the enemy must be persuaded 
that its efforts are futile, and neutrals and outside supporters must be convinced to 
support or not support the opposition.43 With Schleifer’s definition as a guide, the factor 
“target audiences” is measured by determining the presence or absence of population 
interaction, enemy engagement, and international support.44 Population interaction 
indicates how population-centric messaging efforts are coordinated at the operational 
level. Enemy engagement refers to tactical-level messaging targets. International support 
refers to how audiences outside the conflict zone perceive the strategic campaign.45 
b. Target Audiences: Hypotheses 
This advances two hypotheses: 
1. States: A state seeking to gain or maintain legitimacy should seek to use 
deceptive information against the enemy only, and never against the 
population or international audiences. 
2. Non-State Actors: Insurgents may use deceptive information against all 
target audiences, but may lose this ability as they become closer to 
resembling a legitimate counter-state. 
4. Commitment 
The analysis factor “commitment” evaluates the time, manpower, and money 
applied to achieving an objective. Cohen et al. state, “Counterinsurgency always demands 
considerable expenditures of time and resources. People will not support the government 
until they are convinced the counterinsurgent has the means, ability, stamina, and will to 
win.”46 Comparing the commitment levels of adversaries enables planners to appreciate 
the level of production needed (and possible) within an area of operations.  
                                                 
42 Ron Schleifer, “Psychological Operations: A New Variation on an Age Old Art: Hezbollah versus 




46 Cohen et al., “Principles, Imperatives, and Paradoxes of Counterinsurgency,” 51. 
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a. Measuring Commitment 
Measuring the analysis factor “commitment” entails determining the presence or 
absence of time, personnel, and financial investment.47 Time refers to the planned 
duration of information operations—whether for limited engagements or protracted 
operations. “Personnel” is the number of individuals conducting information warfare. 
Financial investment is the funding allocated to the production and sustainment of 
information campaigns.48 
b. Commitment: Hypotheses 
This advances two hypotheses: 
1. States: A high commitment of manpower and funding for the 
counterinsurgents will mean a higher level of message penetration, but can 
become unsustainable over time. 
2. Non-State Actors: A low commitment of manpower and funding for 
counterinsurgents will mean a higher level of insurgent message 
penetration. 
5. Information Dominance 
As a factor for analysis, information dominance is the media sophistication of the 
insurgent and counterinsurgent, the quality of their connections with the people, and the 
ease of information flow they achieve. While both high- and low-tech approaches have 
been used successfully, it is a mistake to assume that the side with the most dominant or 
advanced information technology has the edge, or to view its suppression as the goal. 
Kilcullen claims this is “akin to treating the symptoms of an illness, and just as microbes 
develop drug resistance, so insurgents evolve and adapt to deal with these forms of 
attack.”49 Whether conveyed through face-to-face interaction or high-production-value 
television programming, the quality and acceptability of the narrative remains the key 
element. Nevertheless, identifying the most effective media and delivery mechanisms is 
important in both the propagation and disruption of messaging. 
                                                 
47 Ibid. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Kilcullen, Counterinsurgency, 197. 
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a. Measuring Information Dominance 
FM 3–13, Information Operations, describes information superiority as the 
“operational advantage derived from the ability to collect, process, and disseminate an 
uninterrupted flow of information while exploiting or denying an adversary’s ability to do 
the same.”50 To measure the conditional factor “information dominance,” the presence or 
absence of media options, connectivity, and interference must be determined.51 Media 
options are the situation-dependent strengths and weaknesses associated with each form 
of media available. Connectivity is the type and reliability of the network over which the 
message travels to reach the intended audience. Interference refers to physical obstacles 
and the means by which either side may distort the other’s message.52  
b. Information Dominance: Hypotheses 
This advances two hypotheses: 
1. States: If the counterinsurgent uses media options with the highest level of 
connection to the target audiences and delivers a quality message, the 
probability of a narrative’s acceptance greatly increases. 
2. Non-State Actors: The population’s acceptance of the insurgent’s narrative 
increases when the counterinsurgents choose forms of media that can be 
interfered with, does not reach the intended target audiences, or is of poor 
quality. 
6. Timing 
Timing, as opposed to time in the sense of a finite resource (as discussed under 
the factor of commitment), should be understood as the current phase of the engagement, 
ranging from peacetime to post-conflict nation-building, and the level of weariness or 
resiliency of the state’s security forces in relation to the insurgent’s. Mao Zedong’s 
Theory of Protracted War describes a three-phased approach for insurgencies: a strategic 
offensive (in which the goal is survival), strategic stalemate (in which guerrilla warfare is 
                                                 




used against a conventional army), and strategic offensive (transition to conventional).53  
This description should not be viewed as a template for expected adversarial behavior 
within phases, but could enhance phase awareness which may indicate opportunities for 
disruption of insurgent plans. 
Seizing and maintaining the initiative should be the goal of a counterinsurgency; a 
surefire way to achieve this is through “operational surprise,” where “measures are 
introduced in which the insurgents cannot adapt in time to survive.”54 Deception is a 
proven means by which to achieve surprise and gain the initiative.55 Assessing the 
consequences of timing choices may reveal informational opportunities and signal when 
an initiative may be lost due to counterproductive messaging efforts. 
a. Measuring Timing 
FM 3–24, Insurgent Vulnerabilities, cites the need for momentum as a critical 
factor and recommends assessing the phasing and timing of an insurgency to determine 
whether the insurgent has control over the pace of operations and detect opportunities 
that may arise as strength is waning.56 Measuring the analysis factor “timing” entails 
determining the presence or absence of phase awareness, resiliency, and opportunity.57 
Phase awareness refers to either side’s ability to understand and exploit the current phase 
of the conflict. Resiliency is the speed with which either side can recoup from operational 
losses and unforeseen disasters. Opportunity refers to the recognition and leveraging of 
information events as they unfold.58 
b. Timing: Hypotheses 
This advances two hypotheses: 
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54 Kilcullen, Counterinsurgency, 204. 
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Information Strategy and Warfare, ed. John Arquilla and Douglas A. Borer (New York: Routledge, 2007), 
127. 




1. State: If the counterinsurgents can recognize informational vulnerabilities 
and are prepared to exploit these weaknesses the insurgents will struggle 
to adapt.  
2. Non-State Actor: Insurgents will make information a cornerstone of their 
strategy when they are physically weaker than the state, so as to seize and 
maintain the initiative when conditions are most favorable. 
7. Conclusion 
The population-centric conflicts of the future will often be fought exclusively in 
the human domain, necessitating innovative, low-cost, small-footprint approaches to 
national-security objectives.59 Given the complexity of the information environment, a 
refined approach to conditional analysis is vital to U.S. military success. Advances in 
multiple-criteria decision-making tools such as the AHP and game-theoretical modeling, 
long associated with operations research, provide a comprehensive framework for 
structuring a decision problem reliably. The addition of conditional-factor analysis, as 
offered in this research, provides the quantitative foundation necessary to determine 
which information strategies are optimal in the circumstances and best support overall 
strategy. The result is a decision-making model that can identify the precise truth-to-
deception messaging ratios necessary to gain an operational advantage and to test their 
efficacy.60  
  
                                                 
59 Panetta, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership.  
60 Whaley, Stratagem, 79. 
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III. A QUANTITATIVE DECISION MODEL 
The ultimate goal of stratagem is to make the enemy quite certain, 
very decisive, and wrong. 
—Barton Whaley 
“It is clear that in an era in which traditional nation-states are increasingly pitted 
against loosely affiliated terrorist networks at the local, regional, and global levels, 
terrorist organizations currently have an information advantage over states.”61 This 
imbalance effectively obviates the Clausewitzian principles of war and underscores the 
premise that skillful information strategy may spell the difference between victory and 
defeat.62 The battle within the information realm requires the rejuvenation of 
psychologically based concepts such as deception, so that the United States may regain 
its comparative advantage.63  
The difficulty of generating quantitatively precise information strategies poses a 
complex problem. Unlike kinetic operations, information is difficult to measure and 
challenging to use—and its success is difficult to predict.64 The military establishment 
has been slow to embrace information warfare because its effectiveness “will always be 
more obscure than that of kinetic weapons.”65 The decision model generated in this 
research addresses this concern by providing a tool for calculating optimal information 
strategies. 
                                                 
61 Douglas A. Borer, “Conclusion: Why is information strategy difficult?,” in Information Strategy 
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Complex decisions such as strategy formulation require the support of a logical, 
real-world way to quantify and synthesize an assortment of variables.66 Structured 
decision-making tools such as the AHP and game-theoretical modeling offer a scientific 
approach to priorities and strategies, which is currently not found in conventional 
information-planning processes. These tools may facilitate effective, efficient, and sound 
strategies that can “better anticipate and master the challenges posed by adaptable and 
deceptive opponents.”67  
A. GAME THEORY 
Developed in 1928 by John von Neumann, game theory is the study of strategic 
decision making among two or more opponents—specifically, “the study of mathematical 
models of conflict and cooperation between intelligent rational decision makers.”68 Game 
theory is widely employed in economics, political science, and psychological analysis, 
and particularly in military-strategy formulation, where it can describe, predict, and 
explain adversarial behaviors within a conflict.69  
The classic example of game theory is Albert W. Tucker’s “prisoner’s dilemma” 
(1950), which illustrates of the intractable nature of competitions that blend conflict and 
cooperation.70 The prisoner’s dilemma explains why individuals will not cooperate 
towards mutually beneficial outcomes that serve their self-interest. The premise of the 
game is as follows:  
Two men are accused of a crime and arrested. Both are held in solitary 
confinement, unable to communicate. The state lacks sufficient evidence to convict them 
for the principle crime and hopes to win a conviction on lesser charges. During 
                                                 
66 Thomas L. Saaty and Kirti Peniwati, Group Decision Making: Drawing Out and Reconciling 
Differences (Pittsburgh, PA: RWS Publications, 2013), 1. 
67 Whaley, “The One Percent Solution,” 154. 
68 William Fox, “Introduction to Game Theory” (lecture, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, 
July 30, 2015). 
69 Colin Camerer, Behavioral Game Theory: Experiments in Strategic Interaction (Princeton, NJ:  
Princeton University Press, 2003), 5. 
70 Lynn Arthur Steen and Joseph Malkevitch, For All Practical Purposes: Introduction to 
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interrogation, the prosecutors offer each suspect two choices: a) maintain your innocence 
(or stay silent) or b) rat the other out. “Now it is in each suspect’s best interest to 
implicate the partner and thereby receive a reduced sentence. Yet when both suspects 
confess, they ensure a bad outcome—namely, they are both found guilty. What is best for 
the prisoners as a pair—to deny having committed the crime, leaving the state with 
insufficient evidence to convict them—is frustrated by their pursuit of their own 
individual rewards.”71 Tucker’s prisoner’s dilemma is presented in Table 1. 
Table 1.   The Prisoner’s Dilemma. 
 Prisoner B (remains silent) Prisoner B (betrays) 
Prisoner A (remains silent) Both serve 1 year Prisoner A: 3 years 
Prisoner B: released 
Prisoner A (betrays) Prisoner A: released 
Prisoner B: 3 years 
Each serves 2 years 
 
Conflict in war unfolds much as in the prisoner’s dilemma. Self-interest, 
incomplete information, and lack of cooperation collide to the detriment of sound 
decision making. Using game-theoretical modeling to show the interplay between 
friendly and enemy forces helps decision makers formulate viable strategies with the best 
chance of achieving dominance. Built upon rational choice, apart from morality or ethics, 
game theory anticipates course-of-action selection to maximize the chances of victory. It 
is thus an ideal mechanism for finding cogent strategies for warfighting in the 
information age.72 
B. THE ANALYTIC-HIERARCHY PROCESS 
Developed by Thomas L. Saaty in the late 1970s, the analytic-hierarchy process 
(AHP) is a structured mathematical framework that enables the pairwise comparison of 
                                                 
71 Ibid. 
72 Philip D. Straffin, “Game Theory and Strategy” (Washington, DC: Mathematical Association of 
America, 1993), 27. 
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decision-making criteria to evaluate potential solutions to a problem in a qualitative 
manner. These potential solutions are assigned a numerical weight, which enables diverse 
and often incommensurable elements to be compared in a rational, consistent way.73 Its 
ability to measure the influence of intangible factors in decision making has gained AHP 
widespread use in corporate and governmental settings for 40 years.74  
Applying AHP to a problem set involves five steps: 
1. Structure the problem as a hierarchy, beginning with the decision goal, 
followed by the potential alternatives for reaching it. Conclude by listing 
the criteria for evaluating the identified alternatives. 
2. Rank the decision criteria by determining which elements are most 
important to the decision maker. For example, when comparing 
automobiles, a buyer might prioritize paint color over horsepower.  
3. Synthesize the criteria to generate a set of overall priorities for the 
hierarchy. Continuing the example, this step combines the driver’s 
judgments about price, color, gas mileage and horsepower for cars A, B 
and C into overall priorities for each automobile. 
4. Ensure the consistency of the criteria rankings across the spectrum of 
options. 
5. Determine the best alternative for the decision, based on the results of the 
process.75 
The AHP process is represented in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1.  The Analytical-Hierarchy Process (AHP). 
In the example, the process of buying a car was subjected to AHP. Three premier 
vehicles were evaluated for potential purchase and screened according to four decision 
criteria: color, miles per gallon, horsepower and price. Note that despite one factor’s 
being a subjective element of the problem (color), AHP was able to assign a numerical 
value based on the buyer’s ranking of criteria, by which it is the most significant factor. 
The result is a pairwise comparison of otherwise incommensurable factors across the 
entirety of the problem. In this case, the Porsche was determined the most suitable 
solution. 
The AHP’s capacity to account for any aspect of a problem, whether tangible or 
intangible, makes it an ideal mechanism for evaluating the myriad influence factors found 
within the human domain. Information-strategy analysis conducted without scientific 
rigor will result in arbitrary measurements of no value in optimization. Employing AHP 
yields quantitatively precise measurements in the information realm, which strategists 
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can use to equip military leaders with concrete, discernable plans for greatest battlefield 
impact.  
C. THE CONTROL MODEL 
Information strategy formulation is not a standalone process—it should be a well-
integrated and synchronized aspect of a larger operational plan. While AHP and game 
theory can produce independent solutions to a wide variety of problems, they have not 
previously been jointly applied to generate information-based strategies. To 
accommodate the novel approach this thesis offers, a three-phased control model is 
developed to predict the likely outcome of an information-age battle, using suitable Army 
information tasks as defined in Field Manual 3–0, Operations, to generate an optimal 
information strategy.  
1. Phase 1: Game Theoretical Model—Information vs. Kinetics  
Social-science theory has strong and well-documented qualitative reasons for 
regarding information as a critical component of modern warfare. However, quantitative 
representations of Information Age conflict have rarely been used to test this premise. 
The Phase 1 game-theoretical model developed in this thesis quantifies the likely 
outcome of a war between the U.S. military and a hypothetical non-state adversary 
(reflecting the conflicts typical of the last decade). Two broad, yet distinctive, capabilities 
of the modern military are employed: information and kinetics.  
Phase 1 assumes that the United States and a hypothetical threat are the primary 
interactive players. Within the game, only two variables are available to the players, 
information and kinetics. Information is defined as the effective use of information in 
shaping opinions and perspectives, while kinetics is the employment of lethal combat 
power. An ordinal ranking system (4 to 1) weights the payoffs, with 4 representing the 
best outcome and 1 the worst. Each player attempts to achieve the best possible payoff 
for himself. The construction of Phase 1 is depicted in Table 2. 
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Table 2.   United States vs. Non-State Actor (Information vs. Kinetics). 
 
 
The United States has a military advantage over non-state actors. For this reason, 
the preferred strategy of the U.S. is to engage in a purely kinetic fight, resulting in a score 
of 4 (best outcome), while the asymmetric threat, lacking military might, receives a score 
of 1 (worst outcome). Conversely, the adversary’s preferred strategy is to use its 
information advantage, which undercuts U.S. dominance. In game theory, dominant 
strategies are always employed by rational actors because they consistently yield the best 
outcomes. 76  
As annotated in the darkened region of Table 2, the outcome of Phase 1 is 
resolved with a pure-strategy solution to the conflict. A pure-strategy solution defines 
every possible choice a player might have to make and results in the highest payoff 
possible.77 In other words, Phase 1 demonstrates that a purely kinetic solution to an 
Information Age conflict with a non-state actor is unlikely to result in victory. The 
employment of information is the only way to achieve optimal results.  
                                                 
76 Avinash K. Dixit and Barry J. Nalebuff, Thinking Strategically: The Competitive Edge in Business, 
Politics, and Everyday Life (New York and London: WW Norton & Company, 1993), 119. 
77 William Fox, “Introduction to Game Theory” (lecture, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA. 
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2. Phase 2: AHP—Information Task Prioritization 
Adversaries will always attempt to oppose the United States with every 
informational weapon at their disposal.78 Effectively employed, information multiplies 
battlefield effectiveness and conceals weaknesses. Thus it is important to identify those 
information tools that can best achieve decisive results. Chapter 7 of Army Field Manual 
3–0, Operations, identifies five information tasks that shape the operational environment: 
information engagement, command-and-control warfare, information protection, 
operational security (OPSEC) and MILDEC.79 
Table 3.   Army Information Tasks. 
 
 
Using AHP identifies those information tasks that are best suited for gaining 
information superiority. In this case, the goal is to prioritize the Army information tasks  
 
 
                                                 
78 Department of the Army, Operations,7–2 
79 Ibid. 
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listed in FM 3–0. The criteria by which decisions are made are the analysis factors 
described in Chapter II. They are prioritized as timing first, then target audience, unity of 
effort, commitment, narrative and information dominance (these rankings are for 
illustrative purposes only). Rankings and prioritization for operational decision models 
must reflect command guidance, changes in operational environment, and the erosion of 
resources, which can and will alter the outcome. Therein lies the secondary value and 
relevance of AHP: it can be tailored to fit any situation. 
An essential aspect in criteria ranking is the degree to which one factor is 
prioritized over another—in other words, exactly how much more important is one factor 
over the next? The goal is to be as consistent as possible across all criteria, which enables 
the AHP to assign numerical weights to each factor, thereby enabling a qualitative output. 
Table 4 lays out this process. Column A lists the decision criteria according to the order 
of importance assigned for use in the control model. Column B further sub-categorizes 
the factors as they are compared with one another. Finally, “intensity” refers to the degree 
to which one factor is more important than the next. This is an arbitrary process, but for 
operational examples, observable data drives intensity ratings. In AHP, intensity is 
ranked on a scale of 1–9, with 1 representing equal importance between two criteria and 9 
representing extreme importance in that one element is of the highest possible 
importance. If prioritized consistently, the AHP algorithm will result in a consistency 
rating (CR) that is less than 0.1, which indicates an effective plan. In this case, the CR of 
the control model is 0.011, indicating a strong ranking consistency within the criteria. 
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Table 4.   AHP Criterion Ranking.80 
 
 
Table 5 is an illustration of the consistency outcome associated with the AHP 
prioritization process. 
Table 5.   AHP Criterion Weights and Consistency Rating.81 
 
                                                 
80 AHP weights were calculated by Microsoft Excel-based spreadsheet developed by Dr. William Fox, 
“Multi-Attribute Decision Making and Mathematical Decision Making” (lecture, Naval Postgraduate 
School, Monterey, CA. 7 July 2015). 
81 Ibid. 
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The weights displayed in Table 5 are transposed onto the AHP graphic in Figure 
2. This process happens automatically once rankings and priorities are set by the 
information strategist. For brevity, this AHP computation will not be addressed in future 
iterations. The AHP construct is depicted in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2.  AHP Information Tasks.82 
The AHP prioritized outcome identifies two information tasks as most likely to 
alter the operational environment: protection and MILDEC. Per Army regulation, 
information protection is “active or passive measures that protect and defend friendly 
information and information systems to ensure timely, accurate, and relevant friendly 
information.”83 Information protection lies within the scope of computer-network 
defense, electronic protection, and information assurance, and while critical, it has no 
offensive capabilities or influence potential—it is a purely defensive measure. Thus 
                                                 
82 Ibid. 
83 Department of the Army, Operations, 7–7. 
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MILDEC emerges as the most significant offensive information task for assuring 
information superiority and maximizing operational effectiveness.  
3. Phase 3: Game-Theoretical Model—Truth vs. Lies 
Examination of the Army information tasks reveals two distinct activities that fall 
within the offensive mission parameters of the Psychological Operations Regiment: 
information engagement and MILDEC. Information engagement refers to the various 
methods of achieving behavioral influence against target audiences by leveraging truthful 
information.84 MILDEC, by contrast, has the goal of creating disequilibrium and the 
unique charge of purveying lies to the adversary to obtain an operative advantage. 
Therefore, Phase 3 of the control model subjects the U.S. and its non-state adversary to a 
conflict that employs truth and lies to identify the ratio of truth to deception that will best 
meet strategic goals.  
Phase 3 is limited to a two-by-two construct so as to yield sound yet manageable 
outcomes (larger constructs would yield results beyond the scope of this format). The two 
weapons employed are truth and lies, where truth is any information based in fact and lies 
are any deceptive information intended to mislead. Chapter 7 of Army Field Manual 3–0 
states that truth is the most influential aspect of information.85 Therefore, the Phase 3 
payoffs assign truth as the best outcome (resulting in a score of 4) and lies as the worst 
outcome (resulting in a score of 1) for the United States. The non-state adversary receives 
converse payoff values. This construct is shown in Table 6. 
                                                 
84 Ibid., 7–3. 
85 Ibid., 7–11. While Army FM 3–0 does state that truth is the most influential aspect of information, 
this cannot be viewed as an absolute and should be considered a doctrinal insufficiency. Under certain 
conditions, truthful information will be unable to effectively influence a target audience and help achieve 
victory. These conditions will be identified in Chapter IV of this thesis. 
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Table 6.   U.S. vs. NSA (Truth vs. Lies). 
 
 
In Table 6, the movement diagram reveals that no pure-strategy solution exists for 
Phase 3. That is, neither player can achieve an optimal outcome by employing a one-
dimensional strategy (i.e., a wholly truthful or deceptive information campaign). Going a 
step further, by transposing the game onto a payoff polygon, which plots each player’s 
pure-strategy solutions on X and Y axes, the convex region (everything inside the 
boundaries) displays every possible solution to the game inside the figure.86 Next, the 
derivation of the Nash equilibrium, which identifies an equilibrium value for each player, 
reveals that point (2.5, 2.5) is a sub-optimal outcome.87 This means the possibility of 
achieving a better result is available to each player and the hypothetical conflict will 
continue until that maximum value is reached.  
To determine the optimal solution, computations that simulate a series of 
unilateral actions and reactions, known as strategic moves, will be assessed.88 While 
there are numerous strategic moves that can be synthesized in an effort to determine 
                                                 
86 Miroslav Feix, “Game Theory: Toolkit and Workbook for Defense Analysis Students” (master’s 
thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2007): 61. 
87 William Fox, “Nash Equilibriums: Non-Cooperative Solutions” (lecture, Naval Postgraduate 
School, Monterey, CA 13 August 2015). 
88 Feix, “Game Theory,” 33. 
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game resolution, the remainder of this section focuses only on those tactics that improve 
values beyond the Nash equilibrium result of (2.5, 2.5)—that is, first moves and 
prudential and counter-prudential strategies.  
“First moves” refers to a player’s ability to employ a strategy before the adversary 
commits to playing his strategy.89 This reduces the game to a series of actions and 
counteractions that examine the utility of striking first or conceding the first move to 
improve the outcome. The first-moves chart in Table 7 illustrates that the United States 
will achieve the best outcome by conceding the first-mover advantage and countering 
with MILDEC, receiving a payoff of (3,2).  
Table 7.   Strategic Moves Diagram. 
 
 
Prudential strategies (PS) are an individual player’s best possible outcome, 
irrespective of the other player. Counter-prudential strategies (CPS) are the opposition’s 
best response to a prudential strategy.90 In deriving the various outcomes of multiple 
strategies, the United States can achieve its maximum outcome by employing a counter-
prudential strategy against the enemy’s prudential strategy, resulting in the payoff of (3, 
2.5), as shown in Table 8. 
                                                 
89 Ibid. 







If US initiates with TRUTH ENY will react with LIES
If US initiates with LIES ENY will react with TRUTH
If NSA initiates with TRUTH US will react with TRUTH
If NSA iniaites with LIES US will react with LIES
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Phase 3 analysis reveals that the pre-emptive dissemination of truthful 
information is advantageous to the United States. Yet the military response to non-
traditional threats has been overwhelmingly reactive. The mathematics of the control 
model demonstrate that MILDEC used as a reactive measure in conflict achieves the best 
outcome. Therefore, from a strategy-optimization standpoint, the U.S. will achieve its 
best payoff by implementing an equalizing, mixed-strategy solution of 25 percent truthful 
and 75 percent deceptive information. While adoption of a counter-prudential strategy 
can achieve an improved outcome, it relies on adversarial cooperation—which has been 
discarded as unlikely.  
To solidify the validity of this strategy, the findings of the control model are 
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IV. CASE-STUDY ASSESSMENTS 
In this battlefield, popular perceptions and rumor are more influential 
than the facts and more powerful than a hundred tanks. 
—David Kilcullen 
No two insurgencies are exactly alike, and the methods and means required to 
defeat non-state adversaries are as various as they are complex. Analysis of state-based 
strategies in failed and successful conflicts reveals invaluable details from which 
countless lessons may be derived.91 Of particular interest to this research is the 
examination of optimal or “winning” information strategies. Is a right mix of truthful and 
deceptive information found as a common characteristic among victors? If so, was it a 
fortunate accident or an intuitively constructed, well-integrated aspect of the information 
plan? Conversely, does a flawed or imprecise information strategy indicate an inability to 
assess the effects of narrative, unity of effort, target audience, commitment, information 
dominance, and timing? 
This chapter introduces four case studies selected as conflicts between state and 
non-state actors in which information warfare is well-documented. The analysis factors 
from Chapter II are applied and tallied, from the perspective of the state, to prioritize the 
decision-making criteria required for the AHP. The AHP outcome identifies the preferred 
influence tool (whether truth or lies) to be employed in each case. The results are used to 
populate a game-theoretical model, which synthesizes an optimal ratio of truthful and 
deceptive information for each case study. Finally, each conflict is assessed based on the 
results obtained from the application of game theory and real-world outcomes to 
determine the validity of control-model hypotheses of optimal information strategy.  
A. CASE 1 OVERVIEW: THE DHOFAR REBELLION, 1965–1975 
The sultan of Oman’s epic COIN comeback during the Dhofar rebellion shows 
that positive leadership supported by effective messaging can change even the most 
                                                 
91 Kilcullen, Counterinsurgency, 1. 
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doomed circumstance. Dhofari separatists appeared to have every reason to rebel against 
the oppressive rule of Sultan Said Ibn Taimur, and their movement succeeded due to 
support from a sympathetic population. But when the sultan’s son, Qaboos, took over by 
force and began addressing the grievances of the people, he turned the insurgent narrative 
upside-down by aligning the government’s words and deeds. Both sides attempted to 
employ mostly truthful information strategies, but in the end, it was the “better” truth, as 
seen through the eyes of the populace, that prevailed. 
In 1965, the Dhofar Liberation Front (DLF) launched a guerrilla war against the 
sultan of Oman, Said Ibn Taimur, to liberate Dhofari tribes from his oppressive rule.92 
DLF grievances against the Omanis were exacerbated by the sultan’s failure to provide 
adequate civil-capacity infrastructure, unemployment, a poor economy, and heavy-
handed governmental over-reach, which fueled widespread distrust.93 The Sultan’s fear 
of modernization and unwillingness to engage with the people would be to his downfall. 
With no rival messaging to counter, the DLF seized control of the uncontested 
information environment and won broad support for their cause by exploiting the 
unpopularity of the Omani armed forces’ COIN strategy, which was marked by brutal 
reprisals and mass detentions.94  
By 1970, the DLF, re-named the Popular Front for the Liberation of the Occupied 
Arabian Gulf (PFLOAG), controlled nearly 80 percent of Dhofar. Their overwhelming 
success attracted support from China, the Soviet Union, and Iraq, which brought a great 
influx of kinetic combat power, but also shifted the narrative, which became focused 
solely on the creation of a new communist state.95 At the same time, the systematic defeat 
of the Sultan’s power base spawned a British-supported coup d’état, during which the 
Sultan’s son Qaboos seized power.96 “Qaboos, who was educated at Sandhurst and 
                                                 
92 Christopher Paul, Colin P. Clarke, Beth Grill, and Molly Dunigan, Paths to Victory: Detailed 
Insurgency Case Studies (CA: Rand Corporation, 2013), 275. 
93 Darrell F. Vaughan, “The Integration of Information Operations Into Army Operations During 
Periods of Unstable Peace and Insurgency” (master’s thesis, Kansas University, 2011), 55. 
94 Paul et al., Paths to Victory, 275. 
95 Vaughan, The Integration of Information Operations, 61. 
96 Paul et al., Paths to Victory, 278–280. 
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deeply committed to modernization, immediately launched a five-point program of social 
and military reform that addressed the inadequacies of his father’s regime.”97 Along with 
much-needed reforms came Oman’s first newspaper and radio and television stations, 
demonstrating positive steps towards reconciliation with disaffected Dhofaris. Moreover, 
“the new Sultan insisted on fair and balanced reporting by requiring that all perspectives 
and viewpoints be presented in the news.”98 Rather than attacking the flaws of the 
PFLOAG’s communist narrative directly, the Omani government endeavored to show 
that grievances were being answered and that supporting the legitimate government was 
the better option. 
Ultimately, the PFLOAG strayed too far from its original purpose and lost 
popular support by abandoning its Islamic foundations in favor of an imported 
communist ideology. The populace became convinced that their supposed liberators were 
as harsh as Sultan Taimur, and rejected PFLOAG efforts to abolish Islam in favor of a 
communist regime.99 Having damaged its popular support, the PFLOAG attempted to 
retake the initiative and launched a series of conventional offensives against the Omani 
armed forces in 1972 and 1974. This resulted in irreparable losses for the PFLOAG, who 
faced a modernized conventional military with an effective information campaign under 
the leadership of a popular sultan.100 Despite attempts to destabilize the state through a 
return to guerrilla warfare, the PFLOAG never again posed a significant threat to the 
Omani government.101 Table 9 presents the quantitative compilation of analysis factors 
compiled during case-study research. 
 
 
                                                 
97 Ibid., 280. 
98 Vaughan, The Integration of Information Operations, 70–73. 
99 Paul et al., Paths to Victory, 278. 
100 Ibid., 283. 
101 Ibid. 
 40
Table 9.   The Dhofar Rebellion, State Analysis Factors Chart. 
Factor Sub-Factor State Score 
Narrative 
Unified Message +  
3 Aligned Actions + 
Perception of Justice + 
Unity of Effort 
Political Attunement +  
3 Military Competency + 
Asymmetric Capabilities + 
Target Audiences 
Population Interaction +  
3 Enemy Engagement + 
International Support + 
Commitment 
Time -  
2 Personnel + 
Financial Investment + 
Information 
Dominance 
Media Options +  
3 Connectivity + 
Interference + 
Timing 
Phase Awareness +  
3 Resiliency + 
Opportunity + 
 
In-depth, qualitative explanations of the six factors summarized in this table can 
be found in Appendix A. The analysis-factor scores were used to prioritize decision 
criteria, and this rating was entered into the AHP model.  
1. Application of the Analytic-Hierarchy Process 




Figure 3.  AHP Diagram, the Dhofar Rebellion. 
Based upon the criteria prioritization taken from the analysis chart, the AHP 
model indicates that truth is the preferred informational tool to be employed by the 
Omani state. This matched the operational plan implemented by the Omani state once 
Qaboos seized power.  
2. Game-Theory Result 
The construct of Case 1 (depicted in Table 10) synthesizes the battle between the 
Omani state and its non-state adversary, the PFLOAG. Only two variables are available 
to the players: truth and lies. The payoffs were determined by the outcome of the AHP 
computations, in which the state received a score a 4 (best outcome) for truth and 
1 (worst outcome) for lies. The NSA, assuming interests that run counter to those of the 
state, received an inverse payoff score. The construct of Case 1 is shown in Table 10. 
  
AHP: Dhofar Rebellion 
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Table 10.   The Dhofar Rebellion: Game Theory Model. 
 
 
Case 1 is resolved with a pure-strategy solution to the conflict (that is, one that 
defines every possible choice a player might have to make and results in the highest 
payoff possible).102 Thus Case 1 demonstrates that the Omani state achieved the optimal 
result by employing a proactively truthful information campaign.  
3. Case 1 Analysis 
Subjecting the Dhofar Rebellion to the control model demonstrated several 
consistencies. First, the AHP result determined that the most effective tool in the conflict 
was truth, and history reinforces this finding—the Omani state turned the tide of the 
rebellion by employing a truthful information campaign, focusing on active 
communication with the population. Secondly, the game-theoretical model resulted in a 
pure-strategy solution to the Dhofar Rebellion; the mathematics identified the state’s use 
of a truthful strategy to be the optimal outcome (3,4), predicting the success of the real-
world strategy employed by the Omani state.  
B. CASE 2 OVERVIEW: ISRAEL IN LEBANON, 1982–2000, 2006  
The “Lebanese quagmire” was a trap designed for the Israeli Defense Forces 
(IDF), laid by the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and continued by 
                                                 




















Hezbollah, with the understanding that military force may count for little in the 
information environment.103 Israel’s reactionary methods and low commitment to 
dominating the battle of ideas led to failed objectives and withdrawal in two iterations of 
the Lebanese conflict. Meanwhile, the militarily outmatched and undermanned Hezbollah 
recognized Israel’s weaknesses and employed an aggressive information strategy focused 
mainly on achieving psychological effects through skillful representation of the facts.104 
Israel’s attempt to counter Hezbollah’s “guerrilla war, psychologically waged,” based 
mostly on truthful lines of persuasion, was too slow and ultimately lacked the resources 
needed to win the war of ideas.105 
The IDF invaded Syrian-occupied Lebanon in 1982, after being bombarded by 
rockets and artillery shells for ten days.106 The intent was to thwart aggression from Syria 
and the PLO, who military intelligence believed were amassing arms against Israel.107 
What was meant to be a quick campaign turned into an 18-year effort, for which the IDF 
was unprepared. After signing an uneasy peace treaty with Syria, the IDF withdrew to a 
security zone on the border.108 The unintended consequences of the invasion included the 
“radicalization of the Shiites, which contributed to the establishment of the Iranian-
backed Hezbollah.”109 
Hezbollah, a small guerrilla force numbering just in the hundreds at the time, used 
their brand of psychological operations to analyze the weaknesses of IDF strategy and 
influence various audiences both in and outside the conflict. Hezbollah successfully 
portrayed the Israelis as foreign invaders, exploiting divisions within the Southern 
Lebanese Army (SLA) and community by providing financial incentives to Hezbollah 
                                                 
103 Charles D. Freilich, “Israel in Lebanon-Getting It Wrong: The 1982 Invasion, 2000 Withdrawal, 
and 2006 War,” Israel Journal of Foreign Affairs VI, no. 3 (September 2012): 41. 
104 Schleifer, “Psychological Operations,” 8. 
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loyalists, regardless of ethnicity or religion.110 Capturing military clashes on video 
“allowed Hezbollah to focus on specific incidents allotting them a significance beyond 
their actual battlefield worth.”111 Hezbollah’s reach extended even to the Israeli home 
front, with messages designed to elicit feelings of guilt. “Many Israelis came to feel that 
they had nothing to gain and much to lose from staying in Lebanon, feelings that soon 
filtered up from the public to the political arena, and was one of the reasons Israel quit 
Lebanon in 2000.”112 
After 6 years of relative peace, the IDF were provoked into another Lebanese 
conflict by several Hezbollah kidnappings, murders, and rocket attacks.113 This time, 
however, the IDF waged a psychological-warfare campaign, which was not without 
merit. It was, however, under-prepared, under-resourced, and ultimately at a distinct 
disadvantage, given little military success on which to capitalize and weak lines of 
effort.114 
In both iterations of the Lebanese conflict, Israel played into Hezbollah’s plans, 
and while the IDF did improve their psychological warfare, they ultimately failed against 
an adept and unrestrained opponent with a better understanding of the factors likely to 
influence target audiences.  
  
                                                 
110 Schleifer, “Psychological Operations,” 7. 
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112 Ibid., 15. 
113 Freilich, “Israel in Lebanon,” 45. 
114 Schleifer, Psyoping Hezbollah, 235. 
 45
Table 11.    Israel in Lebanon, State Analysis Factors Chart. 
Factor Sub-Factor State Score 
Narrative 
Unified Message  -  
0 Aligned Actions  - 
Perception of Justice  - 
Unity of Effort 
Political Attunement  -  
1 
 
Military Competency  + 
Asymmetric Capabilities  - 
Target Audiences 
Population Interaction  -  
0 Enemy Engagement  - 
International Support  - 
Commitment 
Time  -  
2 Personnel  + 
Financial Investment  + 
Information 
Dominance 
Media Options  -  
0 Connectivity  - 
Interference  - 
Timing 
Phase Awareness  -  
1 Resiliency  + 
Opportunity -  
 
Table 11 is a quantitative compilation of the analysis factors found in researching 
this case study. Qualitative explanations of the six factors are found in Appendix B. The 
analysis-factor scores were used to prioritize decision criteria, and this prioritization was 
entered into the AHP model.  
1. Application of the Analytic-Hierarchy Process 




Figure 4.  AHP Diagram, Israel in Lebanon. 
Based on the criteria prioritization in the analysis chart, the AHP model indicates 
that lies were the preferred informational tool for Israel, which does not match the tactics 
actually used by the IDF. Israel’s over-reliance on truthful messaging ultimately 
contributed to its withdrawal from Lebanon.  
2. Game-Theory Result 
The setup of Case 2 simulates the battle between the Israeli state and its non-state 
adversary, Hezbollah. Only two variables are available, truth and lies. The payoffs used 
in this construct are taken from AHP computations, which identified lies as the most 
effective informational tool for the IDF. The state received a score a 4 (best outcome) for 
lies and 1 (worst outcome) for truth. The NSA, assuming interests that run counter to 
those of the state, received an inverse payoff score. The construct of Case 2 is displayed 
in Table 12. 
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Table 12.   Israel in Lebanon: Game Theory Model. 
 
 
Case 2 cannot be resolved with a pure-strategy solution. This means that neither 
player can achieve an optimal outcome by employing a one-dimensional strategy. 
Transposing the game onto a payoff polygon and computing its Nash equilibrium 
confirms that Israel must employ a mixed strategy to achieve optimal results.  
The derivation of Israel’s optimal strategy necessitates a strategic-moves analysis 
(Figures 4–7). The IDF achieves its best outcome by initiating with lies, resulting in an 
outcome of (4,2). Finally, computation of an equalizing strategy reveals the exact ratio of 
truthful to deceptive information that Israel would need to achieve victory. In this case, 




Table 13.   Israel in Lebanon: Strategic Moves Diagram. 
 
 
3. Case 2 Analysis  
The IDF’s uninformed pursuit of a truthful messaging campaign to reactively 
correct Hezbollah propaganda ultimately enabled an outnumbered and outmanned 
Hezbollah to dominate the technologically and militarily superior IDF. Factor analysis 
and AHP shows lies being the preferred solution to the Israeli problem set, a course 
rejected in historical events. Game theory indicates that Israel might have achieved a 
better outcome by proactively employing an information strategy consisting of 25 percent 
truthful information and 75 percent deceptive information. While it is impossible to know 
whether this ratio would have led to IDF victory, it does suggest a more concrete, 
discernible plan for more effective MILDEC against Hezbollah.  
C. CASE 3 OVERVIEW: THE IRISH WAR OF INDEPENDENCE, 1917–1921 
While the brief Easter Rising of 1916 failed to achieve its objective of ending 
British occupation of Ireland, it served as the symbolic start of the Irish war of 
independence. With martyrs for the cause and a renewed enthusiasm for independence, 
the defeated Irish Volunteers transitioned from a conventional force to the guerrilla Irish 
Republican Army (IRA) backed by a political wing, Sinn Fein (“We Ourselves”).115 
Embroiled in the final years of WWI, the British were war-weary and unable to adapt 
their techniques for a population-centric war. Their suppression of the IRA included the 
use of undisciplined foreign conscripts, reprisals against civilians, and deceptive news 
media. Fanned by the IRA’s Irish Bulletin newspaper, these heavy-handed measures 
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gained the undivided attention of a once-apathetic population and the international 
community.116  
The IRA’s first target of opportunity was the Royal Irish Constabulary (RIC), the 
British police force in Ireland. The RIC’s main purpose was to prevent and detect crime, 
but they also repressed political unrest.117 The RIC’s tactics included the murder or 
imprisoning of elected republican leaders under unproven charges such as treasonous 
collaboration with Germany.118 In retaliation, the IRA conducted a “widespread series of 
assaults on RIC barracks, a sabotage campaign, and the employment of ad hoc fighting 
units known as ‘flying columns’ to conduct guerrilla warfare.”119 These activities were 
met with severe reprisals against Irish civilians, which only served to increase the 
legitimacy of the IRA narrative, which cast British forces as an “invading army.”120 
Britain declined to address Irish grievances and sought to demonize the 
independence movement by characterizing the IRA as criminals and terrorists. Instead of 
launching a hearts-and minds campaign, the British reinforced the RIC with mercenary 
forces (known as black and tans, or auxiliaries), sanctioned reprisals against civilians, and 
used their own newspaper The Weekly Summary to “feed the faithful and influence the 
ignorant.”121 The best-known example of this strategy was the reprisal for the 
assassination of fourteen British intelligence officers on 21 November 1920, known as 
“Bloody Sunday.” The British-employed black and tans and auxiliaries opened fire on a 
crowd of civilians viewing a soccer match, killing twelve and wounding sixty.122 
Due to these brutal measures and the Irish republicans’ adept use of guerrilla 
tactics and news media, by 1921 the majority of the Irish openly supported or 
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sympathized with the IRA and British forces were rendered ineffective.123 The British 
initiated a truce, providing the impetus behind the Anglo–Irish Treaty, which was 
instrumental in legitimizing the IRA’s cause as something beyond mere criminal 
activity.124 The British pursued an ineffective strategy both militarily and psychologically 
by clinging to reprisals and policing actions and a deceptive media campaign that 
disregarded the population’s knowledge and perceptions. Mindful of the value of public 
support, the IRA acted aggressively in leveraging instances of British injustice. 
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124 Rast, “Tactics, Politics, and Propaganda,” 144. 
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Table 14.   Irish War of Independence, State Analysis Factors Chart. 
Factor Sub-Factor State Score 
Narrative 
Unified Message  -  
0 Aligned Actions  - 
Perception of Justice  - 
Unity of Effort 
Political Attunement  -  
0 Military Competency  - 
Asymmetric Capabilities  - 
Target Audiences 
Population Interaction  -  
0 Enemy Engagement  - 
International Support  - 
Commitment 
Time -   
2 Personnel  + 
Financial Investment  + 
Information 
Dominance 
Media Options  +  
1 Connectivity  - 
Interference  - 
Timing 
Phase Awareness  -  
0 Resiliency  - 
Opportunity  - 
 
Table 14 presents a quantitative compilation of analysis factors compiled during 
case-study research. In-depth, qualitative explanations of the six factors are found in 
Appendix C. The analysis-factor scores were used to create decision-criteria 
prioritization, which was entered into the AHP model.  
1. Application of the Analytic-Hierarchy Process 





Figure 5.  AHP Diagram, the Irish War of Independence. 
Based upon the criteria prioritization in the analysis chart, the AHP model 
indicates that lies were the preferred informational tool to be employed by the British 
during the Irish war of Independence. While case analysis reveals that the British did 
attempt to use deception during the conflict, history notes that the operations were ill 
conceived, poorly executed, and targeted an unsympathetic audience.  
2. Game-Theory Result 
The setup of Case 3 synthesizes the battle between Great Britain and the Irish 
Republican Army. Two variables are available to the players: truth and lies. The payoffs 
were determined by the outcome of the AHP computations; the state received a score a 
4 (best outcome) for truth and 1 (worst outcome) for lies. The NSA, assuming interests 
that run counter to those of the state, received an inverse payoff score. The construct of 
Case 3 is shown in Table 15. 
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Table 15.   Irish War of Independence: Game Theory Model. 
 
 
Case 3 is solved using a pure-strategy solution to the conflict, suggesting that 
Great Britain would have achieved a better outcome by employing a more robust and 
effective deception campaign targeted at the IRA’s decision makers instead of the Irish 
people.  
3. Case 3 Analysis 
British COIN strategy, in the form of a population-centered hearts-and-minds 
approach, was nearly nonexistent during the Irish war of independence. Instead a brutal 
policing effort, reinforced by foreign mercenaries and a misguided and deceptive 
information campaign, were employed. The results of both AHP and game theory show 
that while deception may have been the preferred method for the British, its flawed 
execution and poor choice of target audiences undermined success. This lesson was not 
lost on the British, as evident in their effective use of MILDEC during Northern Ireland 
conflicts in the 1970s.125  
D. CASE 4 OVERVIEW: THE VIETNAM WAR, 1960–1975 
The conflict in Vietnam has been described as the battle of the elephant and the 
tiger. After the French defeat in Vietnam (1946–1954), the United States became the 
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elephant: a massive, unparalleled force lumbering through the jungle and destroying all 
that lay in its path. The combined North Vietnamese Army (NVA) and Viet Cong (VC) 
guerrillas were the tiger, a stealthy, elusive killer hiding and waiting to strike, then 
sneaking back into the shadows. For all the elephant’s strength, it was only a target to the 
tiger, which patiently bled it dry. Ho Chi Minh, the leader of the North Vietnamese, 
applied this metaphor as the foundation of his strategy. President John F. Kennedy (JFK) 
understood this reality as well and worked to increase civil-action programs and bring 
U.S. tigers to the fight in the form of the Studies and Observations Group (SOG), a joint 
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)–U.S. military unit that conducted covert actions, 
psychological warfare (PSYWAR), and unconventional warfare (UW) against North 
Vietnam.126 These efforts, undermined by counterproductive conventional operations, 
were shut down prematurely.127 
Spanning over 15 years, the tempo of the Vietnam War was generally controlled 
by the NVA. Composed of conventional army and guerrilla forces known as the Viet 
Cong, Vietnamese fighting units were distinguished by their ability to shift gears rapidly 
from fighting conventionally to unconventionally, seemingly at will, to devastating effect 
on U.S. forces.128 It is estimated that the NVA, not the U.S., initiated 90 percent of 
engagements during the war.129 This strategy was complemented by a deceptive 
information campaign, which targeted audiences in South Vietnam and the American 
home front, exacerbating low morale and distrust between the civilians and U.S. 
forces.130 Having seized the initiative and demonstrating commitment to unlimited war, 
the NVA choose when, where, and how to fight, with great success. This strategy forced 
the U.S. into a reactionary posture and reinforced reliance on conventional solutions able 
to produce fast results, but of little strategic value.131 
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The prevailing mindset of American senior leaders was that it was necessary  
to destroy the NVA on the battlefield before winning hearts and mind.132 This  
strategy proved backward. While the NVA was often defeated in the battle, the VC 
flourished in the villages and took control of a disaffected population. Massive  
operations by U.S. forces and the indigenous army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) 
undermined public support due to high civilian casualties and the more urgent threat 
posed by embedded guerrillas.133 The United States invested in population-centric civil 
programs coordinated by Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support 
(CORDS) and enemy-centric MILDEC, but did not spend sufficient time and effort  
to understand the information environment.134 Reports discovered in 1997 from  
North Vietnam’s interior ministry showed that Hanoi believed there to be upward of 
2,000 infiltrators sent north during SOG operations, when in reality there were 500. This 
was a direct acknowledgement that SOG’s efforts, particularly operations Humidor and 
Forae, were effective in diverting the NVA’s attention inwards, massively increasing 
their paranoia. If continued, these initiatives might have provided the breathing room 
necessary for mission success.135 
Despite the significant capabilities of the SOG and other special warfare and 
civilian-centric programs, they were regarded as low priority by conventionally minded 
senior leaders, who defended the merits of a search-and-destroy strategy despite its 
failure to bring results.136 Ho Chi Minh, JFK, and SOG understood the Vietnam conflict 
as a war of the people, in which results tended to be less immediate and tangible as body 
counts and territory held, but were deeper rooted and longer term. A more coordinated 
effort on the part of the U.S. might have revealed that conventional operations, supported 
by civil programs led by CORDS and unconventional SOG actions, were a winning 
strategy. 
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Table 16.   Vietnam War, State Analysis Factors Chart. 
Factor Sub-Factor State Score 
Narrative 
Unified Message -   
0 Aligned Actions -  
Perception of Justice -  
Unity of Effort 
Political Attunement  -  
1 Military Competency  + 
Asymmetric Capabilities  - 
Target Audiences 
Population Interaction  -  
1 Enemy Engagement  + 
International Support  - 
Commitment 
Time  -  
2 Personnel  + 
Financial Investment  + 
Information 
Dominance 
Media Options  +  
2 Connectivity  - 
Interference  + 
Timing 
Phase Awareness  +  
2 Resiliency  + 
Opportunity  - 
 
Table 16 presents the quantitative compilation of analysis factors compiled during 
case-study research. In-depth, qualitative explanations of the six factors are found in 
Appendix D. The analysis-factor scores were used to create decision-criteria 
prioritization, which was entered into the AHP model.  
1. Application of the Analytic-Hierarchy Process 




Figure 6.  AHP Diagram, Vietnam War. 
Based on the criteria prioritization in the analysis chart, the AHP model indicates 
that lies were the preferred informational tool to be employed by the United States during 
the Vietnam War. This finding deviates from the actual information strategy generally 
employed during the conflict.  
2. Game-Theory Result 
The setup of Case 4 reenacts the Vietnam War by employing the prevailing 
informational tool identified by the AHP. Two variables are available to the players: truth 
and lies. The payoffs were determined by the outcome of the AHP computations. The 
state received a score a 4 (best outcome) for truth and a score of 1 (worst outcome) for 
lies. The NSA, assuming interests that run counter to those of the state, received an 
inverse payoff score. The construct of Case 3 is shown in Table 17. 
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Table 17.   Vietnam War: Game Theory Model. 
 
 
The Case 4 game is resolved with a pure-strategy solution to the conflict. The 
United States achieved its optimal result (4,3) by employing a deceptive information 
campaign against the NVA and VC.  
3. Case 4 Analysis 
Analyzing the U.S. strategy in Vietnam through the lens of the quantitative model 
reveals both consistencies and deviations from historical occurrence. The AHP indicates 
that lies were the preferred informational tool for the United States. While their efforts 
were not prioritized, the successful deception operations conducted by SOG demonstrate 
the effectiveness of these operations against the enemy. The game-theoretical model, 
which synthesized the war by prioritizing the AHP outcome, ultimately resulted in U.S. 
victory—a premise that can never be fully supported. Nonetheless, the U.S. reliance on 
search-and-destroy operations achieved little strategic success, but effectively widened 
the gap between the people and U.S.-led forces—a vulnerability successfully leveraged 
by the NVA. Unfortunately, the Tet Offensive and subsequent peace talks curtailed the 
gains achieved by innovative SOG operations. Had the U.S. prioritized an enemy-centric, 























Four general conclusions may be drawn from the case-studies examined. First, the 
proactive use of truthful information is a viable course of action. However, purely 
truthful strategies require a proactive and unwavering commitment to consistency that 
must endure over the duration of a conflict, however long. Given the current non-
existence of state-based grand strategies that could facilitate consistency, entirely truthful 
campaigns are unlikely to achieve goals in the Information Age. 
Second, the reactive use of deception is the most effective information tool 
against non-state actors. As states continue to be drawn into conflicts reactively, 
MILDEC provides an ideal mechanism for achieving results. However, successful 
MILDEC must be well synchronized, nested within an overall operational plan, and given 
sufficient time to work.  
Third, pure-strategy solutions that promote deception as the 100 percent 
informational solution to a conflict are an unlikely premise. Yet the prevalence with 
which deception contributes to mathematical victories offers tremendous insight into its 
efficacy in Information Age warfare.  
Finally, case-study analysis indicates that states lose the information battle when 
they neglect the factors of narrative and target audience. Matching words and deeds and 
crafting messages that engage the appropriate audience is of utmost importance in 
formulating an effective information strategy.  
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V. FINDINGS AND IMPLICATIONS 
He who overcomes the enemy by fraud is as much to be praised as he who 
does by force. 
 —Niccolo Machiavelli 
This thesis examines the prevailing theories that attempt to explain America’s 
divestiture from deception operations. Whether institutional shortcomings are the root 
cause or, rather, that contemporary ethical standards dictate a stricter adherence to moral 
factors, it is clear that a once-robust and effective capability has atrophied significantly. 
The dawn of the information age has challenged longstanding military paradigms and 
leveled the playing field between state and non-state actors. In an era defined by 
increasingly constrained resources, a casualty-averse polity, and the realization that force 
cannot guarantee victory, the United States may regain its comparative advantage by 
reinvigorating military deception operations. 
Legacy principles of mission planning, counterinsurgency doctrine, and analysis 
tools do not effectively address the challenges and complexities of the human domain. 
The foundations of information-strategy formulation must be updated to address abstract 
concepts such as the behaviors and ideologies found in modern conflict.137 Drawing 
broadly from existing doctrine, this thesis finds six factors that account for the intangible 
aspects of information warfare: narrative, unity of effort, target audiences, commitment, 
information dominance, and timing. 
Unlike kinetic operations, information strategies are difficult to quantify and 
measure. This problem has limited the acceptance and understanding of information 
warfare, ultimately hamstringing the U.S. in fighting weaker but more agile adversaries. 
To resolve this problem, this research repurposes two structured decision-making tools, 
the analytic-hierarchy process and game-theoretical modeling, to provide a means of 
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generating precise computations of optimal information strategies. The control model 
yielded three findings:  
1. Kinetic solutions to a conflict with a non-state actor are not conducive to 
victory.  
2. MILDEC is the information task best capable of maximizing operational 
effectiveness.  
3. The optimal information strategy ratio is 25 percent truthful information 
and 75 percent deceptive information.  
To verify these findings, the control model was tested against the historical 
outcomes of four case studies: the Dhofar Rebellion, Israel in Lebanon, the Irish War of 
Independence, and the Vietnam War. Four trends emerged from this analysis.  
1. Truthful information campaigns can result in victory. However, truth wins 
only when used proactively and with an unwavering commitment and 
consistency that lasts the duration of a conflict. It is a long-term solution.  
2. When reactively drawn into battle, deception is the only tool able to 
overcome information asymmetry and achieve the best possible outcome 
in the short term.  
3. A deception-heavy information strategy resulted in mathematical victories 
in 75 percent of the case studied. In each conflict, the state lost when its 
strategies did not include effective deception operations.  
4. In the states examined, the analysis factors of narrative and target audience 
were the most overlooked components of information-strategy 
formulation. In each case, the state lost a conflict to a lesser opponent 
when these factors were neglected.  
A. PRECEPTS 
As discussed in Chapter II, one of the major flaws of FM 3–24, 
Counterinsurgency, is its failure to address the interplay between truth and lies in COIN 
operations. Promoting the truth to a population while deceiving the enemy is not as 
simple and intuitive as it may seem. As shown in the case analyses, COIN forces have 
struggled with this concept and achieved success only when they have understood the art 
and science of aligning friendly actions and managing target-audience perceptions. The 
virtues of COIN are adaptation and consistency; those who accurately assess their 
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environment and devise workable and committed strategies have a better chance of 
winning.  
The following precepts emerged from this research. 
1. Be Proactive with Truth, Reactive with Lies 
This research finds that a state may engage a non-state adversary either 
proactively or reactively. When fighting proactively, the most effective weapon is to 
engage with truth, as exemplified by Sultan Qaboos’ strategy during the Dhofar 
Rebellion of creating radio and television stations to unveil critical reforms. His 
command of the operational environment was strengthened by an effective and consistent 
truthful information campaign, in which he clearly demonstrated a commitment to 
addressing grievances. The Sultan’s adversaries, lacking information savvy, were unable 
to engage their target audiences and gradually lost support and relevance.138  
Conversely, when a state is drawn into a conflict, the most effective weapon is 
deception. The Vietnam War, though a far from perfect example, illustrates this concept. 
The NVA and VC dominated the information environment, skillfully manipulating lies 
and truth while the U.S. and South Vietnamese forces struggled with a counterproductive 
strategy that valued body counts over hearts and minds. To overcome this asymmetry, the 
SOG’s inventive MILDEC operations, aimed at undermining NVA leadership, eroding 
morale, and inducing paranoia, achieved devastating effects in short order.139 These 
efforts were terminated prematurely; nonetheless, the evidence shows that MILDEC 
achieved important goals and hints at what might have been had operations been allowed 
to proceed.  
2. Tighten Definitions within the Information Spectrum 
The extremes of truth or lies were chosen to quantify deception operations while 
maintaining simplicity. However, the authors note that an information strategy cannot be 
categorized as purely black or white. Shades and combinations always exist, and these 
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should be more specifically defined—doctrine has yet to adequately articulate some key 
distinctions. FM 3–0, Operations, introduces information superiority by advising leaders 
to, “tell the truth, stay in your lane, and get the message out fast,” and the manual guiding 
psychological operations, FM 3–05.301, advises that, “truth is always the most powerful 
tool,” which dismisses the myriad situations that must consider: narratives, exigencies, 
audiences, and events that might require various ratios and types of information to 
overcome the adversary. Current doctrine presents a polarized view of messaging, while 
the reality of conflict calls for specifically tailored ratios of information. Information 
should be understood to reside on a continuum from outright falsehood (pseudo 
operations) and selective truth (MILDEC) to diplomacy and complete candor, as shown 
in Figure 7. All these choices require balance and conditional awareness.  
 
Figure 7.  The Continuum of Information Solutions. 
3. Complex Environments Call for Simple Decision-Making Tools  
Weaponized information is no longer the exclusive tool of the state. The global 
diffusion of technology has allowed the instantaneous exploitation of information by 
anyone. Despite our prowess on the kinetic battlefield, the U.S. military’s information-
warfare capability has not evolved to effectively combat emergent adversaries in the 
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information realm.140 This difficulty, compounded by the absence of a U.S. information 
grand strategy, has fostered the development within various organizations of independent 
information strategies that lack cohesion, and thus potential effectiveness.  
The size and scope of the modern military has become so bloated that an internal 
focus has been favored at the expense of external effectiveness. In other words, the U.S. 
has over-complicated all aspects of warfighting, to where the contemporary military 
relies inordinately on short-term strategies that lack scientific rigor and consistency and, 
most importantly, are transparent to our adaptable and deceptive opponents. Short of a 
complete overhaul of our political–military structure, the revival of deception operations 
offers a viable, battle-tested method to regain advantage.  
“Warfare is not just a matter of hurling mass and energy at one’s enemies; it  
is also about gaining an ‘information edge.’”141 Perhaps now, after a decade of struggle 
against terrorism, the simple decision-making tool presented here may offer first steps 
towards a reliable and consistent benchmark with which to evaluate operational  
plans. There is no reason information dominance cannot be a reality for the United States. 
The innovative solution suggested by the application of AHP and game theory to 
informational strategy holds promise in ending the information advantages of non-state 
adversaries.  
B. THE WAY AHEAD 
Recommendations for deploying the insights in this thesis are offered below. 
1. Operationalize the Decision Model 
The mathematics presented in this thesis demonstrates the efficacy of deception, 
though it must be noted that the optimal information-strategy ratio generated by our 
decision model is purely illustrative. Nevertheless, the decision model offered herein is 
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able to generate operationally relevant information strategies. The authors recommend 
research in three follow-up areas to exploit and operationalize this tool:  
a. Subject the analysis factors to mathematical hypothesis-testing 
procedures such as linear-regression modeling.  
This is an excellent method to determine the statistical strength between the 
multiple variables introduced in Chapter II and further solidify their linkage to the 
information environment, while more accurately prioritizing the criteria-ranking system 
in AHP.  
b. Apply a non-ordinal ranking system to the game-theoretical construct. 
The use of cardinal numbers, which denote quantities as opposed to rankings, will 
enable the model to generate more precise and operationally relevant statistics.  
c. Expand the game model to include all the tools of information warfare.  
Inclusion of all six tools (pseudo operations, MILDEC, psychological operations, 
public diplomacy, expectation management, and complete transparency, as opposed to 
only truth and lies) will dramatically increase the number of outcomes generated by the 
model, but the results will be much more precise and yield a full spectrum, optimal ratio 
to be employed in a given scenario. 
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APPENDIX A. CASE 1, THE DHOFAR REBELLION—
HYPOTHESIS ASSESSMENT 
The in-depth qualitative explanations of the six factors assessed in the Dhofar 
Rebellion case study are discussed below. 
A. NARRATIVE 
State Narrative: For the counterinsurgents to achieve legitimacy for their cause, 
their stated narrative and actions must be aligned, unified, and in support of a state that is 
perceived as just in the eyes of the populace. 
Assessment: Proved. Both Sultan Taimur and Qaboos’s narratives could be seen 
as aligned and unified—where they differed was in their perception of justice. Sultan 
Taimur never made concessions with the Dhofaris, publicly stated that he wanted them 
destroyed, and carried out a brutal COIN campaign that included mass detentions and 
reprisals.142 On the other hand, Sultan Qaboos initiated a campaign that admitted the 
former regime’s failings and through words and deeds showed it was both different from 
and better than the old. With his five-point plan, he not only told the people his 
intentions, his civil reforms echoed them.143 The people responded positively to Sultan 
Qaboos’ narrative because of its unified message, aligned actions, and perceived justice. 
NSA Narrative: The further the distance between the state’s narrative and 
perceived actions, the more legitimate the insurgent’s narrative and the righteousness of 
their actions in the eyes of the population.  
Assessment: Proved. Under Sultan Taimur’s regime, the DLF’s narrative and 
cause were seen as righteous in the eyes of the population, who sought liberation. While 
Sultan Taimur’s message and actions were aligned, they were viewed as repressive and 
unjust. By the time Sultan Qaboos initiated his five-point plan of reform, it became nearly 
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impossible for the DLF, who had changed their motivations from liberation to the 
establishment of a communist state, to convince the people of its righteousness.144  
B. UNITY OF EFFORT 
State Unity of Effort: The closer the counterinsurgent forces are to the 
indigenous population, in terms of cultural composition and understanding, the more 
effective their messaging will be. 
Assessment: Proved. Sultan Qaboos sought to rectify this problem; his first 
reform was to allow amnesty for disillusioned Dhofari rebels, which led to the 
establishment of firqats or tribal militias, who worked with the British Special Air 
Service (SAS).145 These forces grew to nearly 1,800 and served as invaluable cultural 
experts who were perceived as being of the people.146 
NSA Unity of Effort: The further counterinsurgent forces are from a population’s 
cultural composition and understanding, the easier for insurgent forces to exploit their 
messaging. 
Assessment: Proved. Under Sultan Taimur’s rule, the Omani armed forces were 
led by British officers and composed entirely of non-Dhofaris and Baluchi 
mercenaries.147 This put Omani forces at a significant cultural disadvantage that resulted 
in heavy-handedness and the perception that foreign invaders were doing the Sultan’s 
bidding.148 
C. TARGET AUDIENCE 
State Target Audiences: A state seeking to gain or maintain legitimacy should 
seek to use deceptive information against the enemy only, and never against the 
population or international audiences. 
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Assessment: Proved. Sultan Qaboos insisted on truthful information campaigns 
when dealing with the population, and with the aid of British Army training teams 
(BATT), created the country’s first fair and balanced newspapers, radio, and television 
stations.149 However, there are several instances of MILDEC operations, such as 
Operation Jaguar, that successfully misled the PFLOAG, that through disinformation and 
false information—without the need to lie to the public or international community.150 
NSA Target Audiences: Insurgents may use deceptive information against all 
target audiences, but may lose this ability as they become closer to resembling a 
legitimate counter-state. 
Assessment: Proved. Initially, no deception against the population or international 
community was needed by the rebels to win support, other than the types of enemy-
centric MILDEC inherent in most guerrilla forces. However, when the PFLOAG gained 
control of 80 percent of Dhofar, its original intentions of liberation were replaced with 
the the imposition of communism, which may have been seen as an inadvertent deception 
to the people.151 Also, Radio Aden, the preferred media delivery system of the PFLOAG, 
quickly began to be seen as one-sided propaganda as it was marginalized by the state’s 
“fair and balanced” stations.152 
D. COMMITMENT 
State Commitment: A high commitment of manpower and funding for the 
counterinsurgents will mean a higher level of message penetration, but can become 
unsustainable over time. 
Assessment: Proved. At the height of Oman’s success at the time of the 
insurgency, military forces had grown from 3,000 to 11,700 troops, with support from the 
British (SAS and BATTs) and the integration of nearly 2,000 Dhofari firqats. Committing 
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personnel and investing in the country’s first media outlets aided greatly in achieving 
message penetration.153  
NSA Commitment: A low commitment of manpower and funding for 
counterinsurgents will mean a higher level of insurgent message penetration. 
Assessment: Proved. At first, Sultan Taimur attempted to propagate his COIN 
strategy with ill-equipped and understaffed forces devoid of both Dhofari representation 
and options to communicate with the populace.154 This left the information environment 
uncontested; it took little effort from the communist-supported PFLOAG to influence the 
Dhofari population.  
E. INFORMATION DOMINANCE 
State Information Dominance: If the counterinsurgent uses media options with 
the highest level of connection to the target audiences and delivers a quality message, the 
probability of a narrative’s acceptance greatly increases. 
Assessment: Proved. In addition to the country’s first newspapers, radio, and 
television stations, the Omani government used notice boards, leaflets, and word of 
mouth to promote their civil actions. Their messages included pro-government and 
Islamic imagery, which, in concert with the visible positive changes to Dhofari, aided 
their acceptance.155 
NSA Information Dominance: The population’s acceptance of the insurgent’s 
narrative increases when the counterinsurgents choose forms of media that can be 
interfered with, does not reach the intended target audiences, or is of poor quality. 
Assessment: Proved. Under Sultan Taimur’s regime, very little attention was paid 
to the use of media in the COIN campaign. Dhofari rebels communicated easily with the 
population through word of mouth and Radio Aden. When new channels of media 
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became available, it became easier for Omani forces to interfere with PFLOAG’s 
communications by intercepting their messages and creating false ones.156 
F. TIMING 
State Timing: If the counterinsurgents can recognize informational 
vulnerabilities and are prepared to exploit these weaknesses, the insurgents will struggle 
to adapt. 
Assessment: Proved. The DLF’s transformation to the PFLOAG exemplified by 
the changing of their narrative from liberation to communism was the first opportunity 
seized by Sultan Qaboos. Capitalizing on this while admitting the mistakes of the past 
regime, enacting positive reforms, and offering amnesty to the PFLOAG, the Omani 
government forced the PFLOAG to rely on their new military strength to maintain 
territorial gains.157 
NSA Timing: Insurgents will make information a cornerstone of their strategy 
when they are physically weaker than the state, so as to seize and maintain the initiative 
when conditions are most favorable. 
Assessment: Proved. A cornerstone of the DLF’s original strategy was a truth-
based information campaign that supported its guerrilla efforts. After initial success and 
territorial gains, they began to misinterpret the operational environment, precipitating 
massive mistakes. In changing their stated goals and transitioning to conventional 
warfare, they allowed the new regime opportunity to amend past failings and definitively 
seize the initiative.158 
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APPENDIX B. CASE 2, ISRAEL IN LEBANON— 
HYPOTHESIS ASSESSMENT 
The in-depth qualitative explanations of the six factors assessed in the Israel in Lebanon 
case study are discussed below.  
A. NARRATIVE 
State Narrative: For the counterinsurgents to achieve legitimacy for their cause, 
their stated narrative and actions must be aligned, unified, and in support of a state that is 
perceived as just in the eyes of the populace. 
Assessment: Proved. The narrative driving Israel’s 1982 invasion of Lebanon was 
to seek the destruction of the PLO and the withdrawal of Syrian forces.159 During the 
second Lebanese war, Israel attempted to exploit divisions in Lebanon by presenting 
Hezbollah’s leader Hassan Nasrallah as a liar whose poor judgment resulted in Israel’s 
military reaction.160 Both narratives did little to achieve support from the populace, since 
collateral damage and civilian casualties caused by Israeli bombing undermined the 
message and kept Israel planted squarely as the barbaric enemy perpetrating the 
attacks.161 
NSA Narrative: The further the distance between the state’s narrative and 
perceived actions, the more legitimate the insurgent’s narrative and the righteousness of 
their actions in the eyes of the population.  
Assessment: Proved. Hezbollah’s narrative was strengthened by turning the 
seemingly indiscriminate IDF military campaign into community-building opportunities 
that strengthened the ties between all ethnic groups (Sunni, Christian, and Shi’a) against 
the “Little Devil” Israel. Hezbollah “took care to rebuild any house, whether owned by a  
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Christian or Muslim, damaged by Israeli military action.”162 This also allowed Hezbollah 
to hide their religious agenda of establishing an Islamic Republic under the cloak of 
Lebanese nationalism.163 
B. UNITY OF EFFORT 
State Unity of Effort: The closer the counterinsurgent forces are to the 
indigenous population, in terms of cultural composition and understanding, the more 
effective their messaging will be. 
Assessment: Proved. The IDF failed to recognize the importance of representative 
security-force personnel when building the South Lebanese Army, which consisted 
primarily of Christian soldiers.164 “Low morale and fear that Hezbollah would make 
good its threats produced serious manpower problems within the SLA, forcing its high 
command to bully the local population, including its Shi’a component, into joining its 
ranks.”165 
NSA Unity of Effort: The further counterinsurgent forces are from a population’s 
cultural composition and understanding, the easier for insurgent forces to exploit their 
messaging. 
Assessment: Proved. Shi’a soldiers in the SLA were often deemed untrustworthy 
and were subject to harsh policies by the SLA command, such as taking their families 
hostage. “Pressganged into service, and extremely disgruntled, these SLA soldiers 
became easy prey for Hezbollah and a source of invaluable military, political, and 
psychological information about the SLA and its patron Israel.”166 
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C. TARGET AUDIENCE 
State Target Audiences: A state seeking to gain or maintain legitimacy should 
seek to use deceptive information against the enemy only, and never against the 
population or international audiences. 
Assessment: Unclear. The IDF attempted to stick to a largely truthful campaign 
that focused on pointing out the shortcomings of Hezbollah’s leader, Nasrallah, and to 
correct exaggerated claims made by Hezbollah. These efforts may have begun exposing 
Nasrallah’s flawed policies and hidden agenda, but were unrealized in the course of the 
conflict and undermined by civilian casualties caused by the IDF.167 
NSA Target Audiences: Insurgents may use deceptive information against all 
target audiences, but may lose this ability as they become closer to resembling a 
legitimate counter-state. 
Assessment: Proved. Hezbollah used MILDEC successfully against the IDF, but, 
aside from exaggerations and embellishments, did not rely on a purely deceptive 
campaign to influence other target audiences.168 There were several contradictions and 
weaknesses in Hezbollah’s messaging that the IDF failed to exploit. Most stemmed from 
the incompatibility of Hezbollah’s militant ideology with the Lebanese nationalism they 
pretended to promote.169  
D. COMMITMENT 
State Commitment: A high commitment of manpower and funding for the 
counterinsurgents will mean a higher level of message penetration, but can become 
unsustainable over time. 
Assessment: Proved. The MALAT (Mercaz L’Mitzaei Toda’a: The Center for 
Consciousness Perception Operations) was the IDF’s answer to Hezbollah’s propaganda 
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machine. Created in 2005, the unit was hastily assembled to combat Hezbollah’s 
psychological warfare and included intelligence officers and psychologists.170 “The 
MALAT as part of a conventional army was hamstrung by unwieldy administrative 
processes and, operating in the context of a democracy, was unable to respond quickly, 
creatively to events: all qualities that are essential to the waging of a successful PSYOP 
campaign.”171 
NSA Commitment: A low commitment of manpower and funding for 
counterinsurgents will mean a higher level of insurgent message penetration. 
Assessment: Proved. During the first Lebanon war, Hezbollah took advantage of 
its ability to reach various audiences inside and outside Lebanon with tremendous effect. 
The IDF was incapable of stopping Hezbollah videos and photographs from airing on 
Israeli television with the message that Lebanon was not worth the price that Israel would 
have to pay.172 
E. INFORMATION DOMINANCE 
State Information Dominance: If the counterinsurgent uses media options with 
the highest level of connection to the target audiences and delivers a quality message, the 
probability of a narrative’s acceptance greatly increases. 
Assessment: Disproved. In 2006, the MALAT attempted to reach the people of 
Lebanon through media such as radio, television, leaflets, the Internet, and mobile 
phones. As an informational campaign, the MALAT did well, “The combination of 
leaflets and radio messages convinced a large number of civilians to evacuate prospective 
danger zones, which in turn allowed the army to operate relatively freely and with a 
minimum of civilian casualties.”173 However, this did little to create acceptance of their 
                                                 
170 Schleifer, “Psyoping Hezbollah,” 223 
171 Ibid., 235. 
172 Schleifer, “Psychological Operations,” 7–9. 
173 Schleifer, “Psyoping Hezbollah,” 233. 
 77
overarching narrative that Hezbollah was the root cause of Lebanese strife, since the 
IDF’s actions caused the majority of civilian casualties and collateral damage.174 
NSA Information Dominance: The population’s acceptance of the insurgent’s 
narrative increases when the counterinsurgents choose forms of media that can be 
interfered with, does not reach the intended target audiences, or is of poor quality. 
Assessment: Proved. Hezbollah saturated Lebanese audiences and the Israeli 
home front with weekly journals, video recordings, and websites that seemed to 
overwhelm the IDF’s attempts at a counter-narrative. The messages were not constrained 
by truth; rather they were designed to elicit an emotional response. “Showing pictures of 
innocent civilians maimed or killed by Israeli action helped ignite strong feelings of guilt 
within Israeli society, so much so that the fact that most Israeli engagements were the 
result of Hezbollah provocations was forgotten.”175 
F. TIMING 
State Timing: If the counterinsurgents can recognize informational 
vulnerabilities and are prepared to exploit these weaknesses, the insurgents will struggle 
to adapt. 
Assessment: Proved. The MALAT recognized the potential for exploiting the 
divisions within Lebanese society, but ultimately did not have time to see it through. IDF 
did not have the speed of effort or HUMINT necessary to exploit Hezbollah’s 
exaggerations and embellishments effectively. The MALAT and conventional IDF were 
unable to coordinate military actions with their PSYOP campaign to achieve desired 
effects.176 
NSA Timing: Insurgents will make information a cornerstone of their strategy 
when they are physically weaker than the state, so as to seize and maintain the initiative 
when conditions are most favorable. 
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Assessment: Proved. Hezbollah masterfully integrated information into their 
guerrilla operations by attaching a cameraman to every unit. Every action was filmed and 
the most symbolically impressive ones were presented to the public as quickly as possible 
for maximal effect. The story accompanying the images was often exaggerated to elicit 
strong emotional responses from the target audiences. This coordinated effort proved to 
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APPENDIX C. CASE 3, THE IRISH WAR OF INDEPENDENCE—
HYPOTHESIS ASSESSMENT 
The in-depth qualitative explanations of the six factors assessed in the Irish War 
of Independence case study are discussed below. 
A. NARRATIVE 
State Narrative: For counterinsurgents to achieve legitimacy for their cause, 
their stated narrative and actions must be aligned, unified, and in support of a state that is 
perceived as just in the eyes of the populace. 
Assessment: Proved. The British attempted to label the IRA and Sinn Fein as a 
“murder gang” and to avoid legitimizing their claims to independence by reducing them 
to criminals and terrorists.178 While pursuing this narrative, the British sanctioned 
reprisals against innocent civilians, showed a disregard for the importance of the public’s 
role in the conflict.  
NSA Narrative: The further the distance between the state’s narrative and 
perceived actions, the more legitimate the insurgent’s narrative and the righteousness of 
their actions in the eyes of the population.  
Assessment: Proved. The IRA and Sinn Fein’s narrative of fighting an “invading 
army” was further legitimized by the British’s strategic missteps, including reprisals 
against civilians, the employment of foreign paramilitary forces, and the RIC’s murder 
and false imprisonment of elected republicans.179 
B. UNITY OF EFFORT 
State Unity of Effort: The closer the counterinsurgent forces are to the 
indigenous population, in terms of cultural composition and understanding, the more 
effective their messaging will be. 
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Assessment: Proved. The RIC was composed of Irish citizens, and in the 
beginning the IRA had to explain the targeted killings of these individuals and how they 
were linked to British oppression. Very little messaging was done on the side of the RIC 
beyond the typical local relationship-building of police work, which was hindered greatly 
due to the IRA’s influence in rural areas and the brutal attacks on the RIC.180  
NSA Unity of Effort: The further counterinsurgent forces are from a population’s 
cultural composition and understanding, the easier for insurgent forces to exploit their 
messaging. 
Assessment: Proved. The complication of explaining the IRA’s aggression 
towards the RIC was completely erased when the British chose to employ the black and 
tans and auxiliaries from all over the UK. They were easily labeled as foreign invaders 
and their message was marginalized as British propaganda.181 
C. TARGET AUDIENCE 
State Target Audiences: A state seeking to gain or maintain legitimacy should 
seek to use deceptive information against the enemy only, and never against the 
population or international audiences. 
Assessment: Proved. The British government often published false or discrediting 
information in the press about IRA and Sinn Fein members, such as the fabricated 
justification for arresting elected republicans for colluding with Germany.182 Also, the 
British used the Weekly Summary to propagate cover-ups of reprisals, show progress 
made by pseudo anti-Sinn Fein forces, and false stories meant to boost the morale of the 
British forces serving in Ireland.183 The deceptive efforts were evidence that the British 
had “given up on winning Irish hearts and minds,” but instead, “wanted British support 
for strong measures against them.”184 
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NSA Target Audiences: Insurgents may use deceptive information against all 
target audiences, but may lose this ability as they become closer to resembling a 
legitimate counter-state. 
Assessment: Proved/Unclear. The IRA used the typical enemy-centric deception 
inherent in guerrilla activities, but also used the Irish Bulletin to publicize many truthful 
accounts, point out British aggression, and develop the legitimacy of their cause with the 
Irish people and international audience. The republicans were particularly sensitive to 
their material’s being labeled as “propaganda” and insisted that the correct word was 
“publicity” for what they believed to be the reality of the situation. 185 
D. COMMITMENT 
State Commitment: A high commitment of manpower and funding for the 
counterinsurgents will mean a higher level of message penetration, but can become 
unsustainable over time. 
Assessment: Disproved. The British deployed 50,000 troops to reinforce the 
14,000 strong RIC against the 5,000 Irish republicans who were deemed as mere 
criminals. Despite these numbers and an investment in the Weekly Summary, the British 
failed to match their words and deeds or even condemn the brutal reprisals inflicted on 
civilians.186  
NSA Commitment: A low commitment of manpower and funding for 
counterinsurgents will mean a higher level of insurgent message penetration. 
Assessment: Disproved. The British strategy of policing through mass punishment 
did not gain popular support and played directly into the IRA and Sinn Fein’s narrative of 
resisting foreign aggression. 
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E. INFORMATION DOMINANCE 
State Information Dominance: If the counterinsurgent uses media options with 
the highest level of connection to the target audiences and delivers a quality message, the 
probability of a narrative’s acceptance greatly increases. 
Assessment: Proved. The Weekly Summary was the British counterpart to the Irish 
Bulletin and both were widespread across Ireland. However, the understaffed Weekly was 
designed to promote the RIC and British forces as “keepers of the peace” and reduce the 
Irish republicans to “evil-doers” with little to address the validity of their grievances.187 
NSA Information Dominance: The population’s acceptance of the insurgent’s 
narrative increases when the counterinsurgents choose forms of media that can be 
interfered with, does not reach the intended target audiences, or is of poor quality. 
Assessment: Proved. The Irish Bulletin was the main source of republican 
messaging during the war of independence. The British recognized this and made great 
attempts to forge copies and distribute them with divisive information about republican 
leadership, the IRA’s cowardly tactics, and articles eliciting sympathy for the RIC.188 In 
most cases, these deceptive efforts were obvious and had little effect.  
F. TIMING 
State Timing: If counterinsurgents can recognize informational vulnerabilities 
and are prepared to exploit these weaknesses, the insurgents will struggle to adapt. 
Assessment: Proved. The British never seemed to recognize these types of 
opportunities and chose instead to reactively defend the indiscriminate reprisals 
conducted by their forces sometimes to the point of outright lying. In an attempt to pursue 
a potential division in the republican network, The Weekly Summary attempted to 
promote a supposed “Anti-Sinn Fein Society.” This was later exposed as a cover-up for 
“off-duty policeman conducting reprisals against republican suspects.”189 
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NSA Timing: Insurgents will make information a cornerstone of their strategy 
when they are physically weaker than the state, so as to seize and maintain the initiative 
when conditions are most favorable. 
Assessment: Proved. From the beginning, the IRA and Sinn Fein always 
integrated information into their guerrilla strategy. Starting with issuing a declaration of 
independence and appeal to the “free nations of the world” and then using newspapers  
to win support and sympathy from those inside and outside the conflict, the Irish 
republicans showed they were acutely aware of the importance of public opinion in the 
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APPENDIX D. CASE 4, THE VIETNAM WAR— 
HYPOTHESIS ASSESSMENT 
The in-depth qualitative explanations of the six factors assessed in the Vietnam 
War case study are discussed below. 
A. NARRATIVE 
State Narrative: For counterinsurgents to achieve legitimacy for their cause, 
their stated narrative and actions must be aligned, unified, and in support of a state that is 
perceived as just in the eyes of the populace. 
Assessment: Proved. The U.S. committed fully to the war after the Gulf of Tonkin 
Resolution in 1964, with the stated intent “to bolster South Vietnamese morale, prevent 
the infiltration of fighters and materiel, and punish the insurgents to the point that they 
would sue for peace.”191 This narrative was pursued through a flawed belief that 
firepower could make it a reality, when actually all it seemed to do was “create lots of 
casualties, and lots of refugees, thereby alienating the population of the south.”192  
NSA Narrative: The further the distance between the state’s narrative and 
perceived actions, the more legitimate the insurgent’s narrative and the righteousness of 
their actions in the eyes of the population.  
Assessment: Proved. Any disparities between the U.S. intentions and actions 
helped gain support for the NVA’s narrative of “reunifying the nation.”193 Leaflets and 
slogans created by the NVA capitalized on any U.S. misstep with messages like, “Let’s 
kick the U.S. imperialists out of South Vietnam, win back sovereignty and independence for 
our country, and freedom for our people.”194 
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B. UNITY OF EFFORT 
State Unity of Effort: The closer the counterinsurgent forces are to the 
indigenous population, in terms of cultural composition and understanding, the more 
effective their messaging will be. 
Assessment: Proved. Counterinsurgency programs that integrated indigenous 
forces such as the Montagnards and ARVN had some of the greatest impacts of the U.S. 
strategy. Locally recruited forces had the “ability to maintain close ties with the 
population an essentiality when seeking to root out the VC embedded in the villages.195 
“These programs produced more enemy kills and fewer casualties among American 
forces and Vietnamese civilians than more-conventional operations.”196 However, they 
were vastly under-resourced, as the majority of support went to the conventional war. 
NSA Unity of Effort: The further counterinsurgent forces are from a population’s 
cultural composition and understanding, the easier for insurgent forces to exploit their 
messaging. 
Assessment: Proved/Unclear. Despite efforts to connect and integrate with the 
South Vietnamese, as seen in the Combined Action Programs (CAP) and Civilian 
Irregular Defense Groups (CIDG), the conventional conduct of the war undid many 
gains.197 Conventional forces would typically move through an area, conduct operations, 
and depart soon after. The VC maintained their grip by staying in the villages and often 
used the line of persuasion that, “the government forces will soon leave, but we will be 
here forever.”198 
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C. TARGET AUDIENCE 
State Target Audiences: A state seeking to gain or maintain legitimacy should 
use deceptive information against the enemy only, and never against the population or 
international audiences. 
Assessment: Proved. SOG employed a variety of successful enemy-focused 
MILDEC operations against the NVA by forcing their focus inward to ruthlessly search 
for infiltrators and spies within their own ranks.199These secret efforts were shut down in 
order to pursue honest negotiations with the north.200 However, MILDEC was not the full 
extent of perceived U.S. deception, as it failed to prepare for the exposure of overly 
optimistic reporting and the Saigon government’s corruption. This lack of expectation 
management led to a belief among the civilian population of the south and the American 
home front they were being lied to, which turned them against the war.201 
NSA Target Audiences: Insurgents may use deceptive information against all 
target audiences, but may lose this ability as they become closer to resembling a 
legitimate counter-state. 
Assessment: Proved/Unclear. “North Vietnam was a dictatorship impervious  
to public opinion,” and likewise the NVA and VC used this advantage to influence 
various target audiences through a mostly deceptive campaign. The north’s focus  
on American public opinion and encouragement of anti-war protests was famously 
exemplified by Jane Fonda’s visit in 1972, which convinced many Westerners that “the 
Viet Cong were independent of the North and that Ho Chi Minh and other leaders were 
not communists.”202 
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D. COMMITMENT 
State Commitment: A high commitment of manpower and funding for the 
counterinsurgents will mean a higher level of message penetration, but can become 
unsustainable over time. 
Assessment: Proved. “Counterinsurgency came to be referred to as ‘the other 
war,’ and it was little more than a minor adjunct to the lumbering search-and-destroy 
missions that consumed 95 percent of American resources.”203 The U.S. invested heavily 
in the Vietnam War, but the thousands of lives and billions of dollars spent were 
misallocated to a lopsided conventional strategy that did little to sway the populace with a 
motivating or unifying message. 
NSA Commitment: A low commitment of manpower and funding for 
counterinsurgents will mean a higher level of insurgent message penetration. 
Assessment: Proved. The U.S. commitment to COIN was very low and the VC 
took advantage of this by embedding themselves within the village and pointing out the 
failings of the government’s forces. The heavy-handed nature of the U.S. strategy had the 
effect of “increasing antigovernment sentiment in the countryside and creating a reservoir 
of potential recruits for the Viet Cong.”204 
E. INFORMATION DOMINANCE 
State Information Dominance: If the counterinsurgent uses media options with 
the highest level of connection to the target audiences and delivers a quality message, the 
probability of a narrative’s acceptance greatly increases. 
Assessment: Disproved. While various forms of media, such as radio broadcasts 
and leaflets, were used by the U.S. to propagate an “IO campaign that emphasized the 
truth,” insufficient attention was paid to aligning the message with the reality the 
                                                 
203 Ibid., 419. 
204 Paul et al., Paths to Victory, 183. 
 89
populace was experiencing.”205 “Civilians often became the targets of American 
firepower, a circumstance aided and abetted by the guerrillas.”206 
NSA Information Dominance: The population’s acceptance of the insurgent’s 
narrative increases when the counterinsurgents choose forms of media that can be 
interfered with, does not reach the intended target audiences, or is of poor quality. 
Assessment: Proved/Unclear. More than any specifics of media choices, the 
insurgent’s narrative was aided by the indiscriminate firepower from U.S. forces and lack 
of positive governance from Saigon. Accusations of atrocities and corruption in the 
government dominated the VC’s lines of persuasion and greatly hindered the American 
and Saigon government’s ability to connect with the population.207 
F. TIMING 
State Timing: If the counterinsurgents can recognize informational 
vulnerabilities and are prepared to exploit these weaknesses, the insurgents will struggle 
to adapt. 
Assessment: Proved. Recognition of the north’s fear of infiltration gave rise to 
some of the SOG’s best efforts. One VC leader was quoted as saying, “We never feared a 
division of troops, but the infiltration of a couple of guys into our ranks created 
tremendous difficulty for us.”208 The results of SOG’s MILDEC Operation Forae were 
“North Vietnamese newspapers and radio broadcasts from 1968 revealed a great deal of 
worry over agents, spies, espionage, and subversion. The articles and radio commentary 
had become much more alarmist and far more extensive.” However, this success was 
short-lived as the shocking message came from Washington to cease all operations 
crossing the border in order to pursue negotiations with the north.209 
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NSA Timing: Insurgents will make information a cornerstone of their strategy 
when they are physically weaker than the state, so as to seize and maintain the initiative 
when conditions are most favorable. 
Assessment: Proved. The NVA and VC regarded information warfare, in the form 
of leaflets, slogans, and word of mouth, as an important weapon in their arsenal. Focusing 
on the emotional content of the message rather than the form of technology that delivered 
it proved to be a strength for the low-tech VC. Unrestrained by the truth, they distributed 
messages about made-up U.S. atrocities committed, which were influential and caused 








                                                 
210 Lewy, America In Vietnam, 49. 
 91
LIST OF REFERENCES 
Arquilla, John. “From Blitzkrieg to Bitskrieg: The Military Encounter with Computers.” 
Communications of the ACM 54, no. 10 (October 2011): 58–65. 
———. “Introduction.” In Information Strategy and Warfare, edited by John Arquilla 
and Douglas A. Borer, 1–15. New York: Routledge, 2007. 
Bok, Sissela. Moral Choice in Public and Private Life. New York: Vintage, 2011. 
Boot, Max. Invisible Armies: An Epic History of Guerrilla Warfare from Ancient Times 
to the Present. New York: Liverlight Publishing Corporation, 2013. 
Borer, Douglas A. “Conclusion: Why is Information Strategy Difficult?” In Information 
Strategy and Warfare: A guide to theory and practice, edited by John Arquilla 
and Douglas A. Borer, 233–240. New York: Routledge, 2007. 
Camerer, Colin. Behavioral Game Theory: Experiments in Strategic Interaction. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003. 
CNN. “New Pentagon Office to Spearhead Information War,” February 20, 
2002,http://www.cnn.com/2002/U.S./02/19/gen.strategic.influence/index.html?_s
=PM:U.S. 
Cohen, Eliot, Conrad Crane, Jan Horvath, and John Nagl. “Principles, Imperatives, and 
Paradoxes of Counterinsurgency.” Military Review, (March-April 2006): 49–53. 
Department of the Army. Information Operations (FM 3–13). Washington, DC, 2003. 
———. Psychological Operations Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (FM 3–05.301). 
Washington, DC, 2003. 
———. Psychological Operations (FM 3–05.30). Washington, DC, 2005.  
———. Counterinsurgency (FM 3–24). Washington, DC, 2006. 
———. Operations (FM 3–0). Washington, DC, 2008.  
Dixit, Avinash K., and Barry J. Nalebuff. Thinking Strategically: The Competitive Edge 
in Business, Politics, and Everyday Life. New York and London: WW Norton & 
Company. 
Ducote, Brian M. “Challenging the Application of PMESII-PT in a Complex 
Environment.” Master’s thesis, Kansas University, 2010. 
 92
Elliott-Bateman, Michael, John Ellis, Tom Bowden. Revolt to Revolution. Manchester, 
UK: Manchester University Press, 1974. 
Erlich, Reuven, and Yoram Kahati. Hezbollah as a Case Study of the Battle for Hearts 
and Minds. Ramat Hasharon, ISR: Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center 
at the Israel Intelligence Heritage & Commemoration Center, 2007. 
Feix, Miroslav. “Game Theory: Toolkit and Workbook for Defense Analysis Students.” 
Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2007. 
Freilich, Charles D., “Israel in Lebanon-Getting It Wrong: The 1982 Invasion, 2000 
Withdrawal, and 2006 War,” Israel Journal of Foreign Affairs VI, no. 3 
(September 2012): 41–75. 
Gillespie, Robert M. Black Ops Vietnam. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2011. 
Godson, Roy, and James J. Wirtz. Strategic Denial and Deception: The Twenty-First 
Century Challenge. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2011. 
Gough, Susan L. “The Evolution of Strategic Influence.” Strategy research project, U.S. 
Army War College, 2003. 
Griffin, Jennifer and Lucas Tomlinson. “Army Chief Odierno, in Exit Interview, Says 
U.S. could have ‘Prevented’ ISIS Rise.” Fox News, July 22, 2015, 
http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2015/07/22/exclusive-army-chief-odierno-in-
exit-interview-says-us-could-have-prevented/. 
Handel, Michael I. “Intelligence and Deception.” The Journal of Strategic Studies 5, no. 
1 (March 1982): 122–154. 
Herbig, Katherine L. “American Strategic Deception in the Pacific: 1942–44.” 
Intelligence and National Security 2, no. 3 (July 1987): 260–300. 
Horton, Bobby Lee. “A Content Analysis of Viet Cong Leaflets as Propaganda, 1963–
68.” Master’s thesis, Texas Tech University, 2003.  
Jajko, Walter. “Deception: Appeal for Acceptance; Discourse on Doctrine; Preface to 
Planning.” Comparative Strategy 21, no. 5 (December 2002): 351–363. 
Jajko, Walter. Military Strategy: Thoughts Toward a Critique. Washington, DC: The 
Institute of World Politics Press, 2014. 
Joint Publication. Joint Operation Planning (JP 5–0). Washington, DC, 2011. 
Kilcullen, David. Counterinsurgency. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2010. 
Krakauer, Jon. Where Men Win Glory. New York, NY: Doubleday, 2009. 
 93
Krepinevich, Andrew. The Army and Vietnam. Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1986. 
Kuehl, Daniel, and Dennis Murphy. “The Case for a National Information Strategy,” 
Military Review 95, no.5 (September-October 2015): 70–83. 
Lewy, Guenter. America in Vietnam. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1978.  
McAlexander, Joseph C. “Hearts and Minds: Historical Counterinsurgency Lessons to 
Guide the War of Ideas in the Global War on Terrorism.” Master’s thesis, Air 
University Press, 2007. 
Nagl, John A. Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago 
Press, 2005. 
Panetta, Leon. Defense Strategic Guidance: Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: 
Priorities for 21st Century Defense. Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 
2012. http://archive.defense.gov/news/Defense_Strategic_Guidance.pdf. 
Parry-Giles, Shawn J. “The Eisenhower Administration’s Conceptualization of USIA: 
The Development of Overt and Covert Propaganda Strategies,” Presidential 
Studies Quarterly 24, no. 2 (Spring, 1994): 263–276. 
Paul, Christopher, Colin P. Clarke, Beth Grill, and Molly Dunigan. Paths to Victory: 
Detailed Insurgency Case Studies. Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2013. 
Pratkanis, Anthony R. “Winning Hearts and Minds: A Social Influence Analysis.” In 
Information Strategy and Warfare, edited by John Arquilla and Douglas A. Borer, 
56–85. New York: Routledge, 2007. 
Rast, Mike. “Tactics, Politics, and Propaganda in the Irish War of Independence, 1917–
1921.” Master’s thesis, Georgia State University, 2011. 
Rothstein, Hy S. “Strategy and Psychological Operations.” In Information Strategy and 
Warfare: A guide to theory and practice, edited by John Arquilla and Douglas A. 
Borer, 160–186. New York: Routledge, 2007. 
Saaty, Thomas L. Decision Making for Leaders: the analytic hierarchy process for 
decisions in a complex world. Pittsburgh, PA: RWS Publications, 1999. 
Saaty, Thomas L., and Kirti Peniwati. Group Decision Making: Drawing Out and 
Reconciling Differences. Pittsburgh, PA: RWS publications, 2013. 
Saracoglu, Burak O. “Selecting Industrial Investment Locations in Master Plans of 
Countries.” European Journal of Industrial Engineering 7, no. 4 (January 2013): 
416–441. 
 94
Schleifer, Ron. “Psychological Operations: A New Variation on an Age Old Art: 
Hezbollah versus Israel.” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, no. 29 (May 2006): 1–
19. 
———. “Psyoping Hezbollah: The Israeli Psychological Warfare Campaign During the 
2006 Lebanon War.” Terrorism and Political Violence, no. 21 (April 2009): 221–
238. 
Shultz, Richard H. The Secret War Against Hanoi. New York, NY: Harper Collins New 
York, 1999. 
Steen, Lynn Arthur, and Joseph Malkevitch. For All Practical Purposes: Introduction to 
Contemporary Mathematics. New York: WH Freeman, 1991. 
Straffin, Philip D. Game Theory and Strategy. Washington, DC: Mathematical 
Association of America, 1993. 
Vaughan, Darrell F. “The Integration of Information Operations into Army Operations 
During Periods of Unstable Peace and Insurgency.” Master’s thesis, Fort 
Leavenworth, KS, 2011. 
Whaley, Barton. Stratagem: Deception and Surprise In War. Cambridge, MA: Center for 
International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1969. 
———. “The One Percent Solution: Costs and Benefits of Military Deception.” In 
Information Strategy and Warfare: A Guide to Theory and Practice, edited by 





INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
 Ft. Belvoir, Virginia 
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
 Naval Postgraduate School 
 Monterey, California 
